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ABSTRACT 
THE ETHICAL TURN AND CINEMA: POLITICS AND AESTHETICS 
OF JACQUES RANCIÈRE 
Ozan Kamiloğlu 
MA in Communication and Design 
Supervisor : Assist. Prof. Dr. Ahmet Gürata 
May, 2011. 
French philosopher Jacques Rancière has worked on wide range of topics including 
democracy, literature, the visual arts, particularly film. After translation of his works to 
English, he found a wide audience and academic interest. His works are based on 
mostly a new understanding of equality, which gives him chance to approach both 
politics and aesthetics from similar point of views. This thesis aims at gaining an insight 
the relation between political and aesthetic theory of Rancière and to understand 
reflections of his notion of the ethical turn, on cinema. The ethical turn points a certain 
aspect of the changes in politics and aesthetics after the fall of the Soviets. This thesis 
aims to investigate this new ethics in cinema that emerged after the ethical turn. With 
this aim, the thesis scans the theories of politics and aesthetics and their relation with 
the ethical turn in different works of Rancière and searches for the interdependent 
changes in politics and aesthetics after the ethical turn. This analysis permits a new 
reading of Alfonso Cuarón's Children of Men (2006).The reading of Children of Men 
alongside of an analysis of reflections of the ethical turn in cinema, opens a room for 
catching the motives of the ethical turn in the world order after the ethical turn 
KEY WORDS: The Ethical Turn, Politics, Aesthetics, Jacques Rancière, Children of 
Men
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ÖZET 
ETİK DÖNÜŞ VE SİNEMA: JACQUES RANCIÈRE'İN SİYASET VE 
ESTETİĞİ 
Ozan Kamiloğlu 
İletişim ve Tasarım Bölümü Yüksek Lisans Programı 
Danışman : Doç. Dr. Ahmet Gürata 
Mayıs, 2011. 
Fransız filozof Jacques Rancière demokrasi, edebiyat, görsel çalışmalar özelinde 
sinema'yı da içeren geniş bir alanda eserler vermiş ve çalışmalarının İngilizce'ye 
çevrilmesi sonrasında geniş bir dinleyici kitlesine ve akademik ilgiye kavuşmuştur. 
Eserleri ona estetik ve siyaset bilimine benzer bir açıdan bakmasına olanak veren yeni 
bir eşitlik anlayışına dayanır. Bu tez, Rancière'in estetik ve siyaset teorilerine dair 
derin bir kavrayış kazanmayı ve Ranicere'in etik dönüş kavramının sinemadaki 
yansımalarını araştırmayı hedeflemektedir. Etik dönüş, belirli bir açıdan, Sovyetlerin 
yıkılışı ardından siyaset ve estetikte olagelen değişime işaret eder. Bu tez, etik 
dönüşten sonra ortaya çıkan yeni etiğin sinemada izini sürmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu 
amaç ile tez, Rancière'in farklı eserlerindeki siyaset ve estetik teorilerinin etik dönüş 
ile ilişkisini incelemekte ve etik dönüş sonrası siyaset ve estetikteki birbiri ile 
bağlantılı değişimleri araştırmaktadır. Bu analiz Alfonso Cuarón'un Son Umut (2006) 
filmin yeni bir okumasına da imkan sağlamaktadır. Son Umut'un bu okuması etik 
dönüşün sinemadaki yansımalarının yanı sıra Sovyetlerin yıkılışı ve etik dönüş 
sonrasında ortaya çıkan dünyaya dair motiflerin görülmesi için de bir fırsat 
yaratmaktadır.  
ANAHTAR KELİMELER: Etik Dönüş, Siyaset, Estetik, Jacques Rancière, Son Umut
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Superman declares that the world is too small and connected. Action Comics #900 
 
 
 
1.1. Background 
 
Jacques Rancière is one of the leading French philosophers who came with a distinct 
understanding of politics and aesthetics. Especially over the last decade, his 
philosophy became a fruitful study area for film studies. Rancière was one of the co-
authors of the prominent work Reading Capital with Althusser. During the 68 student 
movements in Paris, he observed that the theory that is constructed by Althusser was 
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not opening enough place for the spontaneous uprisings. This becomes his departure 
point from the environment of Althusser and he declared his opposition to the thesis 
of Althusser in his book “Leçon du Althusser” (Althusser’s Lesson, 2010). He 
questioned the place of knowledge between the thinker and the proletariat, and its 
unequal structure. His shift from the circle around Althusser is described by Rancière 
in terms of a shift away from a hermeneutic reading of texts towards a more 
affirmative view of language. The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in 
Intellectual Emancipation (1991) gives roots of his forthcoming philosophy. 
His philosophy comes up with a presupposition of equality. According to Rancière 
all people are “equally intelligent.” Eric Méchoulan (2004) explains it as: “Equally 
intelligent” , both terms are important: they lead the reflection towards the status of 
political equality, and the legitimacy of ordinary people appearing as intelligent. 
There should be a presumption of intelligence, just as we have conceived, as a right, 
a presumption of innocence” (p. 3).  
Rancière starts with a presupposition of equality and comes up with a new 
explanation of politics. Politics according to Rancière, emerges when the one that has 
no part in the police comes up with a claim of equality. The police is in charge of the 
construction of the social configuration which Rancière calls “partage du sensible”, 
distribution of the sensible. This new explanation becomes the base for his both 
politic and aesthetic theories.  
In his last book, Aesthetics and Its Discontents (2009), Rancière explains what he 
calls the ethical turn, in politics and aesthetics. The ethical turn is the era after the fall 
of the Soviets, in which the law of police order acts as a natural one. After the ethical 
turn, what is and what ought to be become indistinguishable. Different morals of 
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different world views merged into one, into the moral of the police. This turn creates 
a consensus upon this moral and labels others as Evil. After the ethical turn the 
infinite evil and the infinite justice reigns the world.  
Ethical turn also effects the aesthetic perception in the world. After a detailed 
categorization of the aesthetic regimes in the history, Rancière affirms that today 
unrepresentable structures the aesthetic production. After the ethical turn not only 
politics but also art started to imply a consensus upon a one possible moral. The 
unrepresentable become a mean of creating a consensus and eliminate possible 
disagreements.   
1.2. Scope of the Thesis 
The aim of the thesis is to investigate the ethical turn in cinema. However, this 
reading does not only aim to consider the changes in the cinema after the ethical turn, 
but also to understand the term itself better, by use of cinema. Cinema, which creates 
images in a specific distribution of the sensible, with the end of Cold War period, took 
an ethical form in which it implies a consensus in between the bare humans and/or it 
witnesses to the catastrophe of the world.   
 After the ethical turn, cinema took a new shape, like other art forms, in which it 
either assumes a consensus among all population, or witnesses the catastrophe of the 
world. The consensus in cinema is mostly made through the notion of human rights, 
in which human is in the form of bare human. Therefore, not only main stream 
movies but also some critical ones, notably after September 11. imply a consensus 
that creates one social body and one moral of the community. The consensus be fed 
with the infinite evil and the infinite justice. The one moral of the police order brings 
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the existence of the infinite evil, which labels others that are disturbing the 
distribution of the sensible. Consequently, police brings justice to these others not 
with the laws of the states but with the law of the moral of the police. This law 
changes the state to a state of exception whose law is not written in anywhere but 
shaped according to consensus on one moral.  
In cinema another form that came with the ethical turn is witnessing the catastrophe. 
Some movies imply the world as a catastrophic place, but do not offer anything 
instead. Loss of antagonisms after the ethical turn creates pessimism in such kind of 
movies; they show the strength of the police order and the catastrophes in it but not 
with an implication to the transforming forces in it but instead as a static situation. 
These movies mourn for the world.  
Children of Men (Alfonso Cuarón, 2006) enables profound reading of the ethical turn 
because of the catastrophic situation and police order it is depicting. First of all the 
movie draws strict lines between the parts that are in disagreement, or in conflict, 
thus, it is possible to find the roots of the philosophy of Rancière. Secondly, the movie 
is not in a form of fantastic dystopia, but instead a possible future of the capitalist 
world. Therefore, the extreme conditions of the world give the symptoms of the 
ethical turn. Moreover, the way the narration of the movie is constructed becomes a 
comprehensive example of how human rights become a tool for the creation of the 
consensus. 
1.3. Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis contains four body chapters: Roots of The Political Theory of Jacques 
Rancière, The Ethical Turn, Cinema after the Ethical Turn and Case Study: Children of 
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Men. This structure first builds the roots of the theories of the Jacques Rancière, in 
order to have a familiarity with the concepts and language he uses. Then, it explains 
the ethical turn with the use of this terminology. This second chapter attempts to 
explain the ethical turn in both politics and in aesthetics. Third chapter focuses on the 
ethical turn in cinema. It tries to catch the ethical turn that has been discussed in 
second chapter, in cinema and the last chapter discusses Children of Men with this 
perspective.  
First body chapter is separated into two. First section explains the roots of Rancière's 
philosophy that is based on critic of the works of Plato and Aristotle. It explains the 
distinction between polis and demos which is the main separation that gives rise to 
politics. Than the second part of the first chapter, focuses on the conditions that make 
politics. 
According to Rancière, claim of equality is the main motive of the politics. This claim 
creates a disagreement between polis and demos and leads the subjectification of 
demos. Than a dissensus emerges that is in conflict with the consensus that is an 
attempt to abolish the conditions of a possible dissensus.  
Third chapter explains the ethical turn in both politics and aesthetics, by using the 
terms that are discussed in the first chapter. This order; first ethical turn in politics and 
then the ethical turn in politics, is the order Rancière uses in his article. In order to 
explain ethical turn in politics Rancière uses the works of Lyotard – The Others Rights 
– and Agamben, – The State of Exception – which are also the subsections of this 
section.  
Third chapter also focuses on the ethical turn in aesthetics, and to do so, primarily, it 
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focuses on the three historical regimes of art that has been discussed by Jacques 
Rancière in various works. By using the distinctive properties of these regimes, forth 
chapter combines the ideas lying behind the ethical turn in politics with the aesthetic 
theory of Rancière.  
Forth chapter opens up a discussion on ethical turn in cinema. However, before this 
discussion it explains the emancipation theory of Rancière in the section Cinema and 
Emancipation. Than by using the discussion in the third chapter on aesthetics, it tries to 
catch different motives of the ethical turn in cinema. Two sections are also the main 
ideas that has been caught in Rancière's works that helps to discover ethical turn in 
cinema: Cinema of Consensus and Witnessing the Catastrophe.  
Finally the fifth chapter takes Children of Men as a case study and investigates both 
political theories of Jacques Rancière that is discussed in the first chapter and the 
ethical turn both in politics and aesthetics. The section On the State discusses mostly 
the political theories and the chapter the Fishes (rebellious group in Children of Men) 
focuses on the creation of consensus by using the human rights. The last chapter also 
uses the works of other thinkers that are parallel with the notion of the ethical turn. 
Such kind of an approach is important for cinema studies because of three reasons: 
Firstly, the approach of Rancière that is examined in this work gives us a thorough 
study of the relation between politics and cinema; which does not only show how this 
two relate to each other but also, the conditions of the emergence of a political 
cinema. Answer of Rancière to the question “what is politics?” become an answer to 
the “what is political cinema?”. Secondly, this study shows how cinema and politics 
are getting shaped by the same distributions in the society, and how it is possible to 
read these distributions through cinema. And finally, this study underlines a general 
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tendency in the cinema after the fall of Soviets or the ethical turn. This tendency is to 
create a consensus against the “evil” and witness the world in catastrophe.  
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CHAPTER 2 
ROOTS OF THE POLITICAL THEORY OF 
JACQUES RANCIÈRE 
 
 
 
 
"L'enfer est plein de bonnes volontés et désirs" 
(hell is full of good wishes and desires) 
Bernard of Clairvaux 
 
 
 
Jacques Rancière's philosophy is not based on the ontological explanations of the 
term political; instead it bases itself on a conflict. This new explanation of political 
and politics can be counted as the most original and fundamental movement of his 
theory. His new approach is explaining the roots of not only the political theory of 
his, but also the aesthetic theory. Rancière returns to the classical texts in his book 
Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy (1998) and gives a new theory of 
disagreement as well as politics.  
 
2.1.  Demos vs. Polis – Rereading the Classical Texts 
Rancière's reading of ancient texts has critical importance for his philosophy; what 
Rancière makes is through a rereading of the classical text, finding a foundation to 
politics and therefore political.  Rancière identifies two philosophers, Plato and 
Aristotle with two different kinds of political philosophy: Archipolitics and 
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Parapolitics respectively.  
According to parapolitics of Aristotle there are three parts of society (axiaϊ): “the 
wealth of the smallest number (oligoϊ), the virtue and excellence from which the best 
derive their name (aristoi), and the freedom that belongs to the people (demos).” 
(Rancière, 2004, p. 6). First two parts can claim a part in the distribution of the polis. 
Oligoϊ and aristoi, who are the wealthiest and the most accomplished ones can be a 
part of calculations of sharing positions in the representative bodies of the republic 
(Deranty, 2010, p. 47). Demos for Aristotle, then includes first of all the woman and 
the slaves, who does not have any share in the distribution of the parts in the 
republic. And demos, and then includes all neither the best, now the wealthiest. 
Rancières further criticism also shows how today the workers still conceived as not a 
fully complete linguistic subject. From here he defines three different regimes: 
oligarchy of the rich, aristocracy of the good and the democracy of the people. This 
part become significant because, Rancière defines today’s societies as oligarchy, and 
he takes his part by the side of democracy of people, demos. In the terminology of 
Rancière, demos signifies the common people or citizens and refers to people who 
has no part in the distribution of the sensible (La partage du sensible).  
According to Plato's archipolitics, which defines the principles for an ideal political 
arrangement, there are 7 titles to rule: “parents over children, old over young, 
masters over slaves, nobles over commoners are the ones that are from birth. And 
two other, “strong over weak, intelligent over ignorant” which expresses nature 
(Rancière, 2009, p. 39). And the last one is the principle of randomness. Henceforth, 
Rancière states that the last principle is not an arche (a principle of rule) but a kratos 
(a prevailing) (Rancière, 2007a, p. 94). According to Rancière only this last principle 
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can justify democracy, rule of people.  
Rancière, opposes with two different approaches of Greek philosophers, because of 
the place of demos in the polis that these philosophers are attributing to. Before 
passing to the details of his objection, I will examine what is the police in the 
philosophy of Rancière. 
Rancière (2004) defines police in its relation to current politics as:  
"[P]olitics is generally seen as the set of procedures whereby 
aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, the organization 
of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems for 
legitimizing this distribution. I propose to give this system of 
distribution and legitimization another name. I propose to call it the 
police"(p. 28) 
 
Police is the general law, the organization of the distribution of the sensible. “Police 
is in charge of the social configuration of what is called the “partage du sensible”: 
the French partage can have two almost opposite meanings, the first is “to share, to 
have in common,” the second, “to divide, to share out.” (Mechoulan, 2004, p. 4) It is 
the order of ways of seeing or ways of doing, what is sayable, what is visible, and 
what is audible. Police is the natural order of social structure, which is the 
domination. Rancière explains (2009) police as “[T]he police is thus first an order of 
bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of 
saying and sees that those bodies are assigned by name to a particular place and task” 
(p. 24). It should be said that there is nothing to do with the term police and police 
force. Police is not a form of repression but a form of distribution. In this point the 
term gets close to the Foucauldian approach, which states “police includes 
everything”, and the police determines all relationships of “men and things”, which 
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is actually a broader idea of police (McMurrin, 1981, p. 248). In Rancière “[police] 
embodies an order of configuration and visibility of parts, functions and positions, 
where particular names have been assigned to particular roles, and where the sensible 
is partitioned” (Tambakaki, 2009, p. 104). For Rancière police does not directly 
refers to a state apparatus in Althusserian sense, on the contrary, police is sui generis. 
In Althusser, state uses different apparatuses to impose an order to the society, but in 
Rancière, police is not something imposed, but it is a distribution of visible and 
sayable. This is much more looks like “rule by no one” (p. 40) that has been said by 
Hannah Arendt (1998) for the bureaucracy. 
Therefore in ancient Greece, the hierarchical order of people and distribution of 
works in the utopic Greek polis of Plato in which he assigns work to do for citizens 
but excludes sophists and poets, assumes a kind of police order. In the same way, 
today’s societies are govern by a specific kind of police, which is oligarchy 
according to Rancière. He states in Hatred of Democracy (2009a) that, we do not live 
in democracies, we live in States of oligarchic rule” (Rancière, p. 73). It has been 
said before Rancière makes the critic of the state in Plato based on the principle and 
states that democracy can be based on only kratos which states the randomness 
principle of ruling and which is not based on neither birth nor nature. Rancière calls 
this “scandal of democracy”, because demos does not take its right to rule, its 
principle of ruling from its natural or inborn qualities, but without any title. 
However, today, all societies are oligarchic because, in all of them a minority 
governs a majority. It creates a police order in which the sensible is distributed 
through the rule of the minority.  
Rancière (2004) does not equate all police orders; “there is a worse and better police 
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order” (p. 30). One should not think that Rancière is opposing with the existence of 
an order, but instead actually he is trying to show why we should oppose the idea that 
“some police order proves unavoidable” (Deranty, 2010, p. 62) On the other hand he 
persistently strips the police of from its inequality “From Athens in the fifth century 
B.C. up until our own governments, the party of the rich has only ever  said one 
thing, which is most precisely the negation of politics: there is  no part of those who 
have no part” (Rancière, 2004, p. 14). Those who have no part is demos, and demos, 
which is the root of democracy, was never have a part, therefore actually, there was 
never a democratic state. He (2004) also states that, the police order may take a 
shape that, it can make a certain part of society invisible, because police also decides 
what is visible and what is sayable (p. 29). Rancière's approach to police helps him to 
link his thoughts on aesthetics and politics.   
 
2.2 Politics 
In the works of Rancière, politics comes out when demos opposes to the current 
police order. When demos, the ones who have no part, ask for their equality from the 
police order, politics occur. The claim of equality means claim for a totally different 
logic. Rancière (2004) defines politics as follow: 
“politics primary conflict over the existence of a common stage and 
over the existence and status of those present on it. … Politics exist 
because, those who have no right to be counted as speaking being 
make themselves of some account, setting up a community by the fact 
of placing in common a wrong that is nothing more than this very 
confrontation, the contradiction of two worlds in a single world”(p. 
27) 
Therefore according to Rancière politics is not something existing all the time: it 
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finds its existence in its standing against the police. It might be said that politics may 
not exist at all in a police order. It needs claim of a different logic of equality which 
is claimed by the ones who have no part. According to Rancière politics occurs when 
ones who has no right to talk oppose his silence. 
The philosopher defines democracy as the essence of politics (Rancière, 2007a, p. 
94). Democracy, linguistically comes from demos and kratos, therefore, it based on a 
principle of arche, but instead the randomness, which is not based on any natural 
principle. However, democracy does not mean what the first sense of the word 
implies, which is representative democracy. On the contrary, Rancière (2009b) states 
that “representation is an oligarchic form” (p. 57). Democracy is a state of equality of 
the ones who have no part. Therefore, according to Rancière, democracy is not a 
regime, because all regimes are oligarchic (Deranty, 2010, p. 67). On the contrary 
democracy comes into scene with politics, while asking for a fundamental equality. 
Rancière (2004) affirms that democracy 
is not a regime or a social way of life. It is the institution of politics 
itself, the system of forms of subjectification through which any order 
of distribution of bodies into functions corresponding to their ‘nature’ 
and places corresponding to their functions is undermined, thrown 
back on its contingency.(p. 9) 
Tambakaki (2009) highlights that  
“thus, so far as Rancière is concerned, the democratic framework 
comprises: first, a body politic (a demos) as an entity separate from the 
state apparatus, yet empty, in the specific sense we described above, 
namely, as a community of equals (who nevertheless are not); second, 
a constitutive dispute within the demos as a result of the given 
(ac)count of its parts; and third a realm where this dispute could be 
made visible.” (p. 106) 
 
For Rancière any democratic action risks to fall into oligarchy, in the way Plato 
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affirms as every democracy risks being reduced to tyranny. Pessimism of Rancière 
comes from here, because he thinks eliminating police into politics is impossible. 
Moreover, every democratic struggle becomes mere adjustments in police. Therefore, 
it is impossible to change oligarchy with democracy. This paradox is what Rancière 
calls “quandary of oligarchy”. 
In his book, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy (1998), Rancière states three 
different major types of political philosophy. In archipolitics of Plato, that has been 
discussed above, every single piece of the society is assigned a role. Therefore, the 
demos of democracy is changed with the communal body. As an example Rancière 
states that republican project in France, like Plato's archipolitics, “is the complete 
psychologizing and sociologizing of the elements of the political apparatus” 
(Rancière, 2004, p. 69). Also the examination systems in most of the countries, 
whose aim is to distribute specific jobs to the ones who have talent to do, favour the 
creation of such an order of police. Bosteels asserts that “this is an understanding of 
politics as the disruptive effect of equality when verified as the freedom of anyone 
whatsoever to speak in the name of the people” (Deranty, 2010, p. 85). Archipolitics 
does not leave any space in which political moment may occur. This is why Plato, 
does not give any place to poets. 
The second kind of politics is parapolitics of Aristotle, which is defined by Slavoj 
Zizek as follows:  
one accepts the political conflict but reformulates it into a 
competition, within the representational space, between 
acknowledged parties for occupation of the place of executive power 
(Rancière & Rockhill, 2006, p. 71) 
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In Rancière's words (2004), parapolitics transforms the actors and forms of political 
conflict into the parts and forms distribution of the policing apparatus (p. 72). 
Therefore, parapolitics acknowledges the existence of different antagonisms in the 
society, including poor and rich and wars. Parapolitics, is the “problematization of 
the origins of power and the term in which it is framed- the social contract, 
alienation, and sovereignty- declare first that there is no part of those who have no 
part. There are only individuals and the power of the state.”(Rancière, 2004, p. 77) 
Rancière adds that modern parapolitics starts with the invention of the 
“individuality”, instead of the demos. 
The third and final major kind of politics is Marxist metapolitics which assumes an 
underlying infra-political truth. Therefore, the political conflict becomes a shadow 
theater. The meaning of metapolitics in Rancière oscillates between the meaning 
behind the substances and the empty operators through which the ones who have no 
part identify with the whole society; which is to say, between a positive and negative 
meaning. There is also one last term that Rancière mentions which is ultra-politics. 
Ultra-politics, rather than a kind of political philosophy, is the attempt to depoliticize 
conflicts through bringing it to an extreme via the direct militarization of politics 
(Rancière & Rockhill, 2006, p. 71). 
Rancière criticizes political philosophy, because in all its forms it becomes a way of 
suspending the possibility of the emergence of the political. Today in the time of 
post-politics, Zizek says that  
the conflict of the global ideological vision embodied in different 
parties who compete for power is replaced by a collaboration of 
enlightened technocrats (economists, public opinion specialists..) and 
liberal multiculturalists; via the process of negotiation of interests, a 
compromise is reached in the guise of a more or less universal 
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consensus.(Rancière & Rockhill, 2006, p. 72) 
 
When one is thinking on politics, it is possible to read it in an archipolitical way 
(Rancière sees Pierre Bourdieu in this school) or/and parapolitical way (like 
Habermas or Rawls) or/and in a metapolitical way (Marxist reading of politics). 
Rancière's unique approach to politics gives a totally different perspective which is 
based on the claim for equality. It has been said that, according to Rancière, politics 
starts when the ones who have no part come with a claim of equality.  
Police, as power practices and social life styles, builds inequalities, but 
such a construction has to appear natural. Politics is a precarious 
momentum, when a few illegitimate people affirm their fundamental 
equality with others. (Mechoulan, 2004, p. 4) 
 
We have seen the meaning Rancière is giving to people or demos; now what French 
philosopher means by equality will become the focus of question. 
2.2.1 Equality 
Todd May (2010) states that “the central divide in traditional political theory run 
between those theories that advocate for liberty and those that advocate for 
equality”(Deranty,  p. 69) On the one hand, classical liberal theories may be the ones 
which are valuing the autonomous nature of human being as the reason for all 
creativity. On the other hand, classic Marxist theories may be the ones that are seeing 
inequality (in the access to goods or income, or social services) as the reason of an 
unjust society. Both of these two approaches take equality as something that is 
received from the State. The State gives equal chance of opportunity and liberty or 
income and goods. Rancière's approach opposes this idea. For Rancière equality is 
not something that is given but something which is created by demos, in demos. In 
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Disagreement Rancière (2004) states that: 
“There is order in society because some people command and others 
obey, but in order to obey an order at least two things must are 
required: you must understand the order and you must understand that 
you must obey it. And to do that, you must already be the equal of the 
person who is ordering you. (p. 16)  
 
This is the very first dilemma in inequality. A speaking being is equal with another 
just because of this nature of ordering and obeying. However, one should not 
understand this as an affirmation of an essence of human being. He, of course, knows 
what Foucault showed for history, Deleuze for ontology, Levinas for ethics, Derrida 
for language: that there is neither unity of humanity nor a concept of essence. What 
Rancière is offering us is a presupposition of equality. His book Ignorant 
Schoolmaster (1991) explains his project and this presupposition which actually 
requires nothing but accepting the assumption that all people are equally intelligent. 
This being equally intelligent does not mean the IQ charts or talent, but only being 
able to run his or her own life. It starts from the very first dilemma of inequality, that 
every single person is able to speak with the other in the same way. Therefore, this 
presupposition of equality is the equality of every speaking being, not because of any 
essential feature, but because of being able to be a part of society, to speak with 
others, to run his/her life. For Rancière (1991) “[O]ur problem isn’t proving that all 
intelligence is equal. It’s seeing what can be done under that presupposition. And for 
this, it’s enough that the opinion be possible” (p. 46). Therefore, it is not an 
ontological claim, but a political assumption. This presupposition of equality also 
assumes the equal capability of all for political action. According to May (2007): 
It is simply to assume that people are capable of political action on 
their own behalf. In this sense, it is an assumption without which 
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progressive politics cannot even be conceived. Without  assuming 
this, without “trusting the people” to this minimal extent, one cannot 
even begin to critique the hierarchies and dominations of a given 
social order. (p. 27)      
 
This is also the main critique of Rancière to Althusser. Althusser claims that 
revolutionary movements definitely need a prior political theory. However, Rancière 
considers this as raise of the authority of knowledge of theory. Namely, he believes 
that in Althusser, the authority of the class shifts to the authority of knowledge. 
The presupposition of equality does not offer a specific target group, like Marxism 
and workers class. But instead, it depends on the political movement and the 
character of demos, and leaves the right to claim for equality to the ones who have no 
part in any particular situation. In this way, his theory gets close to the notion of 
power relations and domination as elaborated by Foucault. “The essence of equality 
is in fact not so much to unify as to declassify, to undo the supposed naturalness of 
orders and to replace it with the controversial figures of division”(p. 32), says 
Rancière (2007a). Therefore, for him, politics is actually a matter of claiming for the 
fundamental equality. This also shows his belief in Democracy, which means the 
equality of every single being in demos. There may be different kinds of inequality 
and different groups of people having no part in different areas of the police order : 
in the society workers may claim their equality from the capitalist logic of economy; 
women and homosexuals from the patriarchal sexist society or exploited people from 
imperialists. In all conflicts in the society, there is a group who are deciding and 
others who are exposed to the decisions. Demos asks for its fundamental equality and 
opposes to all principles that are based on arkhe: it asks for democracy based on 
kratos. And this equality is not something which gets distributed, but it is 
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presupposed in the demos. Politics, then, does not lye under the actions that are 
asking for equality but rather, in the ones who are presupposing that they are already 
equal. If they ask for equality it means they are looking for a distributor to share 
equality, however, on the contrary, demos should have the equality in themselves. 
There are two important terms that Rancière is using while explaining a political 
conflict that is a result of the claim of equality. These terms are “disagreement” and 
subjectification.  
 
2.2.2 Disagreement 
Claim of demos in order to reach equality results with a conflict between the ones 
who are taking their share from the distribution of sensible and the ones who does 
not have a part. Rancière calls this conflict, disagreement (mésentente). In the book 
Disagreement (2004), he starts from Aristotle. According to the Greek philosopher, 
speech is something different from voice. Voice belongs to slaves and animals, but 
speech belongs to mankind. Slaves cannot use speech “by nature”, therefore, in the 
writings of Aristotle men cannot understand slaves, by nature. Rancière states that 
the disagreement between the ones who are governing and others that have no part 
still continues. Disagreement in not based on Habermasian competing views but, on 
whose voice counts. As Zizek showed, now we are living in a world of ultra-politics 
in which “compete for power is replaced by a collaboration of enlightened 
technocrats (economists, public opinion specialists..)”. Thus, the others, the people 
does not have a voice anymore in this political scene. May recalls the words of 
President Bush after 9/11 when he said that the best thing people could do at that 
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moment was to go for business and especially shopping (Deranty, 2010, p. 74). The 
people, demos, do not count as a speaking being anymore. There are specialists of 
economy, of law-making or different parts of 'politics'. From this perspective, what 
Aristotle was observing about slaves seems not that far. Other examples can be taken 
from discussions about nuclear energy: governments generally say to leave the issue 
to specialists as if others does not have a voice: this is called a disagreement in 
Rancière's terminology.  
It has been stated that according to Rancière politics does not happen in police, but 
between police and demos. Rancière (2004) continues: “An extreme form of 
disagreement is where X cannot see common object Y is presenting because X 
cannot comprehend that the sounds uttered by Y form words and chains of words 
similar to X's own. This extreme situation – first and foremost – concerns 
politics.”(p. 12). Politics is a result of extreme or not, disagreement. First of all, the 
part Y, by talking with X, presupposes an equality, which makes him try to talk with 
X. Therefore, the fact that Y is talking with X is a claim for equality. Secondly, X 
cannot understand the chain of words and logic that is created by Y, therefore, there 
is a disagreement. Furthermore, the fact of talking and disagreement becomes a claim 
for a voice, through which, politics occurs. This claim of demos forces people to 
accept the fact that police is not covering the situation in itself; there is an outside of 
the police. Dean (2009) explains that  
Rancière introduces in disagreement as internal to the political, as a 
division within politics between two perspectives linked by the gap 
between them (a parallax gap wherein the same object appears 
slightly different when looked at from the perspective of each 
division). Politics, then, is the manifestation of this gap or division. 
Examples of the division between politics and the police in the history 
of political thought appear as divisions between legislation and 
execution, between constituent and constituted power, and between 
 21 
 
the people as sovereign and as subject. (p. 24) 
 
When there is a situation of disagreement, a relation between the police and 
the demos emerges. Rancière calls this relation a wrong (le tort): “A wrong 
can only be treated by modes of political subjectivization” (Rancière & 
Rockhill, 2006, p. 93). Wrong becomes a specific form of equality, and 
Rancière (2004) calls wrong, “a polemical universal, by tying the 
presentation of equality, as a part of those who have no part, to the conflict 
between parts of society” (p. 39). With wrong the people manifests itself as a 
part which is excluded by police. Wrong, shows in a way, the ones who have 
no part exist. This is why it is a mode of subjectification, which is different 
from victimization that will be discussed later. Like the concept of equality, 
wrong, comes from demos, it does not expect victimization from a 
hierarchical up, or from the ones who are policing.  
 
2.2.3  Subjectification 
If wrong is a mode of subjectification, then it is needed to understand what Rancière 
means by it: “By treating a wrong and attempting to implement equality, political 
subjectification creates a common locus of dispute over those who have no part in 
the established order”(Rancière & Rockhill, 2006, p. 92) When a group of people 
comes with the presupposition of equality, they create a locus, through which 
individuals of demos emerge as a part of the disagreement, that makes them a we. 
Therefore, subjectification unites the individuals of demos through a claim of 
equality. This is why, the wrong itself is “a singular universal”. it is related to the 
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ones who have no part and it creates a specific locus of those people. This is how 
politics emerges: “Politics does not happen just because the poor oppose the rich. It 
is the other way around: politics (that is, the interruption of the simple effects of 
domination by the rich) causes the poor to exist as an entity.” (Rancière, 2004, p. 11). 
This existence of (in this specific context) poor proves their existence as a we: they 
become visible by police through the politics. Moreover, subjectification 
reconfigures the field of disagreement. Rancière states (2004) that “By 
subjectification I mean the production through a series of actions of a body and a 
capacity for enunciation not previously identifiable within a given field of 
experience, whose identification is thus a part of the reconfiguration of the field of 
experience” (p. 35). This is exactly what Mechoulan underlines as reconfiguring the 
sensible. Rancière (2004) affirms that main ways to build modes of subjectification 
(a wrong) are figuration, configuration, refiguration, which also brings the 
vocabulary used as a meeting point between the visible and the sayable (since, 
sayable is determined by the police order, it comes toward the visibility of demos) (p. 
5).  
The term “we are all Armenians” that is used by people marching after the 
assassination of Armenian journalist Hrant Dink may be an example of this situation. 
It is worth to remember that this expression has been used for Jews before. The claim 
“we are all Armenians” was first of all totally an egalitarian claim, since Armenians 
are exposed to violence in the society. So the claim for being an Armenian was 
aiming : first, to show that although we are Turks (or from a different origin), we can 
be Armenian, consequently Armenians are equal with others. Second, to show 
although we are also a part of larger demos, that is shared with Hrant Dink (they may 
be intellectuals, journalists, socialists, or activists), and we are screaming for equality 
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with other citizens that are not oppressed. Therefore, through the massive cortege 
that was held after the assassination of the journalist and through the motto “we are 
all Armenians” what was happening was the subjectification of the ones who have no 
part. Different people, with different common points have been visible to police. 
Maybe they found the unifying reason of demos in different points, but finally they 
created a feeling of we and wrong and finally a disagreement.  
Before passing to next chapter there is one last point to stress about the 
disagreement, the widely used way of eliminating the ones who have no part from 
demos by creating a consensus over a issue.    
 
2.2.4 Dissensus  
Dissensus in the works of Jacques Rancière is “a political process that resists 
juridical litigation and creates a fissure in the sensible order by confronting the 
established framework of perception, thought and action” (Rancière & Rockhill, 
2006, p. 85). The term dissensus can be explained as the first step of a disagreement, 
which is the situation of the slaves in the example of Aristotle, who understand 
language but do not possess it. If disagreement is the conflict that gives birth to 
politics, then dissensus is the situation of the parts that are in disagreement. Rancière 
states “dissensus is slaves understand language but don’t possess it”. In order to let 
politics emerge, first of all a dissensus should be expressed. “The appearance of 
Demos is because of the verification of that equality, the construction of forms of 
dissensus” (Bowman & Stamp, 2011, p. 5) says Rancière.  
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It is not possible to think about dissensus without a disagreement. Two parts in a 
situation of dissensus make a disagreement. In the previous sections the details for 
the creation of a dissensus in order to open the ways to politics is discussed. Before 
passing to the concept of ethical turn, it is needed to focus on how police prevents 
politics to occur. 
 
2.2.5 Consensus 
In the previous section it has been exposed how politics emerge. The other side of 
the coin is how polis carries on its existence in a specific police order. Rancière uses 
the term consensus to indicate the de-politicization of this process. Consensus for 
Rancière is simply the production of police. Through consensus, a specific police 
order sets the rules for distribution of what is visible and sayable, and different 
hierarchies in the society. Consequently it is also consensus that sets these 
hierarchies. Consensus is “a specific regime of sensible, a particular way of positing 
rights as a communities arche” (Rancière & Rockhill, 2006, p. 84) says Rancière. 
Consensus bans the subjectification and reduces politics to police, by abolishing 
dissensus. Consensus assumes that all parts of political conflicts, disagreement, can 
be incorporated into political order (Rancière & Rockhill, 2006, p. 84). Tom Conley 
(2005) states that “consensus is what turns a political community into an ethical 
community. It is a world of one, in which everyone counts” (p. 103). Therefore, 
consensus eliminates the political through totalization of people into one body. This 
is what Rancière (2004) calls “the utopia of postdemocracy”, which would express 
“total of 'public opinion' as identical to the body of people”(p. 103). For Rancière, 
most common way of creating a consensus over an issue is identification of 
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democratic opinion with pools and simulation. Through pools and simulations, 
public opinion, that silences other voices and erases democracy, works as a tool of 
de-politicization. Consensus, finally become a way of legitimization of the current 
“democratic” politics. Rancière (2004) states, what consensus presupposes is “the 
disappearance of any gap between a party to a dispute and a part of society” (p. 102). 
It is the disappearance of mechanisms of appearance. Consensus vacuums the 
freedom of people and convinces them everything can be resolved by objectifying 
problems. However, this process of objectification uses the terms of the current 
police which act as politics.  
Creation of consensus in the current politics then leads also what Dean (2009) calls a 
“democratic drive”. He states that, in a situation of disagreement, which is the 
emergence of gaps between the demos and police, the contemporary setting is not the 
one of simple opposition between post-political consensus and the eruption of 
irrational violence (and Rancière sees eruption as a return of the archaic). Rather than 
that, it involves the satisfaction of the democratic drive as its aims remain inhibited 
(Dean, 2009, p. 35). 
In this perspective, democracy works as an objet petit a, explained by Zizek (1993): 
Spatially, a is an object whose proper contours are discernible only if 
we glimpse it askance; it is forever indiscernible to the 
straightforward look. Temporally, it is an object which exists only qua 
anticipated or lost, only in the modality of not-yet or not-anymore, 
never in the ‘now’ of a pure, undivided present (p. 156). 
 
Consensus, which is dismissing the dissensus, at the same time, dismisses the 
democracy constantly. Democracy becomes objet petit a, it is never able to be in 
“now” of a pure, undivided present. Since, the creation of consensus actually 
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totalizes the people in one body, and then democracy has already got lost. Dean 
(2009) adds that “there can be past democratic ideals – nostalgic fantasies of Athens, 
town meetings, our days in the resistance – or there can be hope for the future, 
justification of present acts in terms of this future, but there isn’t responsibility now” 
(p. 26) . Moreover, Dean calls this situation as a drive that generates satisfaction 
while circulating around democracy, which is never reachable. According to him 
(2009), for “democracy thus takes the form of a fantasy of politics without politics 
(like fascism is a form of capitalism without capitalism): everyone and everything is 
included, respected, valued, and entitled. No one is made to feel uncomfortable. 
Everyone is heard and seen and recognized and has a place at the table” (p. 21) 
Consensus tries to include everybody and stabilize them into their place in police 
order and secures the feeling of comfort in the part they have been settled.  
Finally, consensus does not let different parts of the people emerge in the people. 
Rancière (2009) summarizes this other kinds of people as the ones embodied in the 
state, inscribed in the existing forms of the law and constitution; the ones by this law 
or whose right the state does not recognize etc. (p. 115). All possible forms of the 
people create one body of people, which does not leave any space for dissensus. 
What Rancière calls de-politicization becomes de-democratization in Wendy 
Brown’s terminology. Although his approach is not a philosophical but a more 
political one, Brown (2006) states that  
“democratic subjects who are available to political tyranny or 
authoritarianism precisely because they are absorbed in a province of 
choice and need-satisfaction that they mistake for freedom. From a 
different angle, Foucault theorized a subject at once required to make 
its own life and heavily regulated in this making—this is what 
biopower and discipline together accomplish, and what neoliberal 
governmentality achieves.” (p. 705)  
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If in Rancière’s theory, freedom vacuumed for the sake of being a part of the social 
body, in this case it is by neoliberalism. Neoliberal governmentality dismisses 
democracy by offering a choice of being a part of consensus, and while taking the 
freedom of people, rewards them with being a part of the public body. Therefore 
consensus turns the people or demos into a population. And population takes people 
as a pure biological being. Agamben observes: 
“this is something we must be aware of: we live in an era when the 
transformation of people into population, or of a political into a 
demographic entity, is an accomplished fact. The people is today a 
biopolitical entity strictly in Foucault's sense and this makes the 
concept of movement necessary.”(“Giorgio Agamben on the 
movement,” n d)  
 
Along with Agamben, Rancière also considers the transformation from the people to 
population as an accomplished fact. Agamben (1998) adds “it can even be said that 
the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power” (p. 
6). The production of consensus is then the main activity of what Agamben indicates 
as the sovereign power. The term Sovereign power in the way Agamben uses it, 
corresponds to the police in Rancière. The main activity of police is creation of 
consensus, elimination of possible dissensus. This era that we live in takes a specific 
form notably after the fall of the Soviets, which is to say, after the ethical turn. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE ETHICAL TURN 
 
 
 
3.1. Ethical Turn in Politics 
 
Rancière explains what the ethical turn is in the last chapter of his book, Aesthetics 
and its Discontenst (2009). He separates the ethical turn into two: ethical turn in 
aesthetics and ethical turn in politics, which are connected to each other. In this 
section what he means by ethical turn in politics will be examined.  
He starts with stating what could the ethical turn mean according to explanation of 
the word morals. The ethical turn would mean “there is an increasing tendency to 
submit politics and art to moral judgments about the validity of their principles and 
consequences of their practices” (Rancière, 2009, p. 109). However, this is not what 
Rancière is trying to say. The ethical turn is not related to judging the way how we 
make politics or art with moral norms. “On the contrary”, says Rancière (2009), “it 
signifies the constitution of an indistinct sphere” (p. 109). It is not the reign of moral 
judgments over politics and art, but elimination of the distinction that separates these 
two spheres. There is another separation which is getting lost, the distinction between 
“what is and what ought to be”. Rancière calls this the distinction of fact and law. We 
cannot say what should have been because there is not distinction between what is 
going on and the judgment on it. This creates the inclusion of “all forms of discourse 
and practice beneath the same indistinct point of view.” Then Rancière (2009) 
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defines the ethical turn as: “On the one hand, the instance of judgement, which 
evaluates and decides, finds itself humbled by the compelling power of the law. On 
the other, the radicality of this law, which leaves not alternative, equates to the simple 
constraint of an order of things” (p. 110). After the ethical turn, the judgement 
merges with the fact, then law occurs. This law behaves like the order of things that 
we all are in consensus upon. Therefore, the judgment abolishes, or gets into law 
which leaves no alternative to other point of views, through which politics can 
emerge. After the ethical turn, then, there is no space for politics, since there is no 
space for other points of views rather than order of things that mimics the life. 
Rancière adds that as far as this indistinction between fact and law grows, “an 
unprecedented dramaturgy of infinite evil, justice and reparation” comes into scene. 
The law, or the law of police, that acts like the fact, also starts to signify the justice. 
Before it was possible to judge a fact as it is just or not, but after the ethical turn, the 
justice becomes something in the police, belongs to the things that seems like they 
are in their natural order. Therefore, this extended meaning of law, creates the feeling 
of infinite evil and infinite justice.  
In order to explain the concept of infinite evil, Rancière uses the film Dogville (Lars 
von Trier, 2002). He says the film is a transposition of Bertolt Brecht's story, Die 
Heilige Johanna der Schlachthöfer (1929-1930). In the original story everything is 
divided into two between the capitalist jungle and the Christian morality. The story 
explains how the morality is ineffective against capitalism’s violence and finally 
transformed to a militant morality against oppression. Rancière (2009) affirms, “the 
opposition between two types of violence was therefore also that between sorts of 
morals and of rights” (p. 111). And Rancière adds that this division is exactly what 
politics is. Politics is not the opposition of two morals but their division. A division 
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that creates the disagreement. However, in Dogville, which is new version of Die 
Heilige Johanna der Schlachthöfer, what one cannot see is the reason of the evil. The 
evil that Grace is exposed to “refers to no other cause but itself” (p. 111). Grace is the 
excluded “who wants to be admitted into the community, which brings her to 
subjugation before expelling her” (p. 111). The local community creates the evil in 
itself, because of the evil. Therefore, there is no system of domination any more. 
Finally, if there is no specific reason of the violence, a moral that legitimize the 
violence, then the only way to abolish it is the “radical annihilation” of the 
community. This brings us to infinite justice, which can be reached only by violence 
against the infinite evil. A complete annihilation of the community that, the evil 
comes out. Rancière remind us, the rejection of the movie from Cannes, with the 
reason lacking of humanism. He (2009) affirms we should understand humanist 
fiction as elimination of the justice (justice of Grace), by hiding the opposition 
between just and unjust (p. 112). Afterwards Rancière states this is why we can think 
on the Clind Eastwoods Mystic River (2003). Jimmy executes Dave, with accusation 
of murdering his daughter. The crime of Jimmy stays secret in between him and his 
friends including police officer Sean, because, Rancière (2009) states, what they 
share “exceeds anything that could be judged in a court law” (p. 112). The guilt 
exceeds a judgment because in the common past of them, Jimmy and Sean witnessed 
the kidnapping of Dave in which he has been raped and stay silent. This event in 
which there is a guilty of Jimmy and Sean creates a trauma in Dave that made him 
the ideal culprit for the murder of Jimmy’s daughter.  
In Mystic River the key term for Rancière is trauma. It is the trauma that makes Dave 
the ideal murderer, and again it is trauma the cause of Jimmy killing Dave. Also it is 
possible to think of the possible trauma of the ones who have kidnapped Dave in his 
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childhood. From this point of view, Rancière (2009) underlines that “today, evil, with 
its innocent and guilty parties, has been turned into the trauma which knows neither 
innocence nor guilt, which lies in a zone of indistinction between guilt and 
innocence, between psychic disturbance and social unrest” (p. 112). Trauma now 
takes the place of justice. Rancière adds that it is not a sickness that we know from 
the movies of Alfred Hitchcock and Fritz Lang that can be cured with reactivation of 
childhood memories. Now the trauma “become the trauma of being born, the simple 
misfortune that befalls every human being for being animal born too early” (p. 113) 
From this misfortune nobody can escape, it is a infinite trap, and consequently it is 
above the notion of justice. Thus the endless trauma eliminates the idea of justice. 
Rancière (2009) affirms that “infinite justice then takes on its humanist shape as the 
necessary violence required to exorcise trauma in order to maintain the order of 
community” (p. 113) This already implies a social body of the community, a social 
body of population. Rancière turns to the Lacanian explanation of the trauma by 
using Antigone. In the case of Oedipus, father and brother of Antigone, trauma cured 
by reactivation of the past memory. However, in the case of Antigone, trauma does 
not have an end or beginning (Antigone buries her brothers against the will of the 
ruler Creon, supports her action with a moral discussion on the edict and her actions, 
then was punished by Creon). In this case there is no end or cure. Rancière states that 
according to Lacan, Antigone is the terrorist because she witnesses the secret terror 
that underlies the social order (p.114). Therefore terror is the name for trauma in 
political matters. Rancière (2009) adds that terror “designates a reality of crime and 
horror” but also “throws things into a state of indistinction” (p. 114). When we think 
of the current order, terror is not only the crime of a singular event but it is also “the 
fear that similar event might recur” (p. 114) If we turn back to the example Mystic 
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River, trauma or terror can only be eliminated by infinite justice from Jimmy, which 
is actually another form of terror. Terror can be eliminated by a war against terror 
which includes preventive justice to stop the terror, and also continuous as far as 
terror does. Therefore, Rancière (2009) says that “this is a terror which by definition 
never stops for beings who must endure the trauma of birth” (p. 114). The search for 
infinite justice puts itself above the law. It tries to protect the social body that law is 
in and leads to a permanent terror.  
The ethical turn is the imperative schemes of our experience in the misfortune of 
Grace and the execution of Dave (p. 114). Now it is possible to turn back to the first 
explanation of the ethical turn: indistinction of law and fact or elimination of the 
division between different forms of morality. The example of Dogville shows that 
there are no more two moralities in opposition, but instead, the evil that emerge from 
itself, and affects the social body. There is no good and bad moral but instead infinite 
evil and infinite justice. It is the same notion of infinite justice that is used by G. W. 
Bush after September 11 attacks. Infinite evil does not have a moral root, it is out of 
nowhere and because of misfortune, it can be only eliminated by infinite justice, 
termination of all. More “humanitarian” approach of the Mystic River adds that this 
infinite justice actually is the result of infinite circle of trauma or terror in politics. 
Infinite justice assumes one singular body of society and this one body owns the 
moral as well. The only moral possible over the law: it includes both law and the fact 
which are inseparable.  
This is exactly what Rancière calls consensus. For him (2009), consensus “defines a 
mode of symbolic structuration of the community that evacuates the political core 
constituting it, namely dissensus” (p. 115) Thus, in that community in consensus law 
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and fact are merged into each other. There is no distinction of different morals or 
rights but instead a moral of all. If we recall the politics, which emerges with the 
claim of equality of demos and creates a disagreement with the police, consensus 
does not let politics to come out anymore. In the time of the ethical turn, 
disagreement is called terror, which is sickness from birth. There are no different 
rights anymore, since there is only one right: the right of the global community and 
its parts. There is only one kind of people which is not a political subject anymore 
but a mere part of the population.  
Rancière (2009) states that “[consensus] strives to reduce the people to the 
population, consensus strives to reduce right to fact” (p. 115). This is what Rancière 
calls transformation of a political community into an ethical community. This is the 
de-politicization of the community through consensus. The people that are looking 
for their rights become the ones that are the radical other, since the community is the 
great equality of all. They are equal to each other as singular parts of the social body. 
After the ethical turn, the social body tries to include everybody and every part of 
society. The ones that are excluded become not the people that are looking for their 
right but the ones who have the infinite evil. This creates the search for an infinite 
justice which is actually another face of the terror. If we turn back to Lacan, the 
people who are witnessing the terror of the social body become the terrorist and the 
excluded at the same time, since social body includes every single being. The feeling 
of a social bond that binds all parts of society is not able to reach the excluded or the 
radical other. Rancière states that “the de-politicized national community, then, is set 
up just like the small society in Dogville – through the duplicity that at once fosters 
social services in the community and involves the absolute rejection of the other (p. 
116). Therefore, even if there is an obvious abuse of rights, the community rejects the 
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absolute other. 
According to Rancière, the increasing indistinction between fact and right is at 
national level. Nevertheless, at international level, this process takes a rather tortuous 
way: via the constitution of a right above all other rights – the absolute right of the 
victim – we can observe the disappearance of the right itself (p.116). This absolute 
right of the victim is human rights. Rancière points out the transformation of the 
concept of human rights. During the 1980's the concept of human rights have been 
rejuvenated by the dissident movements of Eastern Europe and after the fall of 
Soviets these rights became the “ostensible basis for a new national consensuses 
could also serve as a basis for a new international order” (Rancière, 2009, p. 117). 
Human rights became the rights of the all victimized populations of ethnic wars, 
religious wars, raped women and massacred men. Finally, human rights became “the 
absolute rights of those without rights” and “absolute response beyond all formal and 
juridical rights” (Rancière, 2009, p. 117). 
The absolute rights of the victim can be exercised only by another party. Therefore, 
people whose rights have been abused, become the passive objects for another party 
who acts like the responsible right distributor This gives to this other party the 
absolute right to intervene for humanitarian reasons in order to bring infinite justice 
to populations against the invisible absolute evils: “that absolute right then became 
identified with the direct demand to protect the security of a factual community” (p. 
117). Like the feeling of infinite justice in Mystic River, the concept of humanitarian 
war against terror and the feeling of infinite justice come into scene: an endless 
trauma, which does not have a beginning or end, the evil which comes into scene 
again and again, and finally an endless warfare. According to Rancière (2009), 
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“What is opposed to the evil of terror is, then, either a lesser evil, simple 
conservation of what is, or waiting for salvation to emerge out of the very 
radicalization of catastrophe” (p. 118). He underlines that there are two major forms 
of this transformation: first, it brings affirmation of the rights of the forces and a 
philosophical justification to such kind of an intervention; second, a hope for 
salvation from this reign of continuous terror. These two assumptions are connected 
to the works of two other philosophers: Jean-François Lyotard with his essay “The 
Other's Rights”, and Giorgio Agamben with his concept of state of exception.  
 
3.1.1. The Other's Rights 
Rancière states that the article of Lyotard explains one of the aspects of the ethical 
turn. The article has been written after the question of Amnesty International: what 
happens to human rights in the context of humanitarian intervention? By using ideas 
of Arendt and Burke, Lyotard explains that bare human being has no right but a 
citizen has: 
A human being has rights only if he is other than a human being. And 
if he is to be other than a human being, he must in addition become 
another human being. Then "the others" can treat him as their fellow 
human being. What makes human beings alike is the fact that every 
human being carries within him the figure of the other. (Shute & 
Hurley, 1994, p. 136) 
 
This figure of the other that stays in us, makes the other a human being for us. There 
is no bare human being; one needs the existence of the other to be a human. Human 
rights then, are always in somewhere else than in their place. Now it is worth to 
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remind the place of the term equality in Rancière’s terminology: a speaking being is 
equal with another just because of this nature of ordering and obeying. And politics 
emerges as a claim for this equality. Now, by using Lyotard, Rancière states that 
political action sets in the gap between the human and the citizen, as a form of 
dissensus. However, after the ethical turn, Rancière (2009) states “this 'other than 
human' being undergoes a radical mutation” (p. 119). Citizen turns into what Lyotard 
calls inhuman, which is a part of ours on which we have no control. Inhuman is an 
incomplete human. Rancière states that “inhuman is that radical dependency of 
human on an absolutely other which cannot be mastered” (p. 119). What is called the 
right of other becomes the right to bear witness to our subjection to the law of the 
Other (p. 119).  
After the ethical turn, in the time of humanitarian action and consensus, there is no 
gap anymore between the human and the citizen, since citizen turns into an 
unmasterable inhuman. Inhuman may be childhood dependency, or obedience to an 
absolute other. And when citizen turns into inhuman, right of others become right to 
bear to witness what they are exposed to. In the time of consensus our rights as a 
citizen become our rights as an inhuman, and the relation between human and the 
other become unmasterable, so one can only witness to the law of the other. When 
somebody tries to master this unmasterable relation what happens is the violation of 
human rights. Jews in Nazi camps, who were respectable citizens before, become 
people that bear witnessing to the law of the Other, and their extermination was 
actually mastering to the unmasterable. 
3.1.2 State of Exception 
Rancière (2009) affirms “[Agamben’s] analysis, however, sums up well what I call 
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‘the ethical turn’ (p. 120). The state of exception is a series of essays that have been 
written after Homo Sacer. In one sentence what Agamben says is “the state of 
exception or state of emergency has become a paradigm of government today” 
(Raulff, 2004, p. 1). Before it was possible to see the limits of police, and there were 
situations, which could be called exceptions. However now, the state turned to the 
state of exception, which does not have any exceptions anymore. Nazi State and 
extermination camps for example, could have been declared as a state of exception; 
however, today Guantanamo and American democracy is not that different, Agamben 
says. He states that camp is the nomos of the society.  
Agamben starts with the idea of Carl Schmitt who defines sovereign as “he who 
decides on the exception” (Schmitt, 2006, p. 5). Agamben takes this argument and 
states that the sovereign “creates and guarantees the situation” that the law needs for 
its own validity”. Sovereign is the one who decides the limit of the Law, so if a 
situation is a state of exception or not. The sovereign, thus, draws the border between 
the order and the exception. Mills (n d.) states that “the sovereign determines the 
suspension of the law vis-à-vis an individual or extraordinary case and 
simultaneously constitutes the efficacy of the law in that determination.” (p. 44)  
Moreover, Agamben adds that, even during the situation of the exception in which 
the Law is suspended, there happens a relation between the Law and the exception. 
What makes a rule is the very existence of the exception. Agamben (1998) states that 
“the exception does not subtract itself from the rule; rather, the rule, suspending 
itself, gives rise to the exception and, maintaining itself in relation to the exception, 
first constitutes itself as a rule. The particular force of law consists in this capacity of 
law to maintain itself in relation to an exteriority” (p. 18). To have an inside you need 
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an outside; to have an outside you need an inside. And the inside of Law determines 
what is in the outside, where is the border line. Sovereign rests exactly on that 
border. 
After the ethical turn, the State of exception becomes the rule itself. It does not leave 
any empty areas for politics to exist. Rancière (2009) affirms that, “as a result, this 
situation comes to appear as the accomplishment of an ontological destiny that 
evacuates the possibility of political dissensus and the hope of future salvation bar 
the advent of an improbable ontological revolution” (p. 120). What Rancière was 
calling disappearance of the gap between fact and law again reigns: In the state of 
exception rule becomes the rule of everything, it includes the fact as well. We can not 
talk anymore about two different morals, but the state of exception which in 
Rancière’s words (2009) “erases the difference between henchmen and victims, 
including even that between the extreme crimes of the Nazi State and the ordinary 
everyday life of our democracies” (p. 120). The differences between inside and 
outside, police and demos, got lost in the state of exception: “together with the 
process by which the exception everywhere becomes the rule, the realm of bare 
life—which is originally situated at the margins of the political order—gradually 
begins to coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, outside and 
inside, bios and zoē, right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction.” 
(Agamben, 1998, p. 9). Rancière (2009) adds that after the ethical turn “all 
differences simply disappear in the law of a global situation” (p. 120). In this state of 
indistinction, the law, according to Agamben (2000), then, “is valid precisely insofar 
as it commands nothing and has become unrealizable”. 
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3.2 The Ethical Turn in Aesthetics 
 
3.2.1 Regimes of Arts 
“Regimes of arts” is the door to the aesthetic thinking of the philosophy of Jacques 
Rancière. Regimes of arts are broad categorization of the history of aesthetics which 
has been shaped by economic, social, political and cultural revolutions. However, 
this categorization is not a linear and mono-causal one. Deranthy (2010) states that, 
“a regime of arts thus specifies how a given epoch thinks of the ways in which 
human expressions stand in a relationship to the world, what words and other 
expressions capture from it” (p. 117). Therefore, the regime of arts focuses on the 
relation between understanding and the language and meaning in historical context. 
However, these regimes are not strictly historical because in a specific period more 
than one regime can coexist. Rancière states that regime is "a specific relation 
between the practices, forms of visibility, and modes of intelligibility that enable us 
to identify the products of these...". Gabriel Rockhill (2006) proposes, in Rancière’s 
writings: “a regime of art is a mode of articulation between three things: ways of 
doing and making, their corresponding forms of visibility, and ways of 
conceptualising both the former and the latter” (p. 91). According to Rancière 
aesthetics is not a discipline but rather a particular “regime of identification of art”. 
What Rancière is doing with this categorization is, thus, categorizing the aesthetics. 
On the other hand, this attempt of Rancière is in accordance with his political 
philosophy. Actually, by categorizing the regimes of art, Rancière, gives an 
interpretation to the distribution of the sensible (“partage du sensible”), in a broad 
sense. Deranthy (2010) states that according to Rancière, the meaning and the value 
of artistic expression is  
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“characterized in relation to the respective significance given to other 
activities, but also in relation to the significance of the different 
elements making up social reality (for instance the home, the 
workplace, the market, the political institutions), as well as the 
significance of modes of being (for instance the qualities deemed to 
be attached to the conditions of worker or political leader), and of 
socially defined times and spaces.”(p.118) 
 
All this significances in Rancière are shared in a specific way in a specific time, 
which is the distribution of the sensible. Therefore, distribution of the sensible is the 
term that connects the politics and aesthetics into each other. Eric Mechoulan (2004) 
states that “far from folding back aesthetics onto sensory data and human nature (or 
even culture as our very nature), aesthetics supposes a play between police and 
politics” (p. 6). And this play is due to the distribution of the sensible, a sharing on 
visibility, functions and positions of parts in an order. For Rancière politics is than, 
an aesthetic activity. While the police order, attempts to protect a certain distribution 
of the sensible, the dissensus forces to change the lines of that specific distribution. 
The police configures the sensible, and the politics refigures it. Differences in the 
distribution of the sensible gives base for the identification of regimes in art. 
However, instead of this broad definition of the distribution of the sensible, Deranty 
(2010) identifies five basic different structural elements, that Rancière uses to 
separate regimes of arts.  
the world itself, in its material and human dimensions; what in the 
world is significant (both meaningful and socially valuable) and thus, 
worthy of representation; language, or speech, or text, as the 
discursive articulation of meaning; the artefacts in which meaning is 
expressed for which Rancière uses the term image; and finally 
cummunity to which the artist addresses himself/herself, effectively as 
an actual audience (p.118) 
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A regime of art defined in the writings of Rancière according to the five elements 
that are listed above. These properties also bring contradictions that are specific to 
that regime of art and these contradictions define the regimes. Rancière identifies 
three regimes of art: Ethical regime of images, representative regime of art and the 
aesthetic regime of arts. Among these three regimes, the aesthetic regime of arts is 
the main interest of Rancière. The ethical turn in aesthetics as well is related to this 
regime.  
The ethical regime of images is articulated from the view of Plato on art. In this 
regime, the artworks are conceptualized according to their distance to the ideal 
model. Most important feature of the art work is its truthfulness to this ideal model. 
This regime is called ethical, because as Plato stated the art works has a certain 
influence on the ethos of the community. Therefore, the artwork has to be educative. 
Rancière (2002) states “In the ethical regime, works of art have no autonomy. They 
are viewed as images to be questioned for their truth and for their effect on the ethos 
of individuals and the community,” (p. 135, note 1). This regime has not ended still, 
it is possible to see it in modern art forms, particularly in films. Discussions about the 
impact of movies on audiences is an appearance of this regime.  
The representative regime of arts is covered more in the works of Rancière; because 
the shift from the representative regime to the aesthetic regime gives crucial clues on 
how to approach art today. The representative regime of arts liberated art from the 
moral and religious criteria. This regime is based on the poetics of Aristotle, 
however, it is the name of general system of representation. Deranty (2010) states 
that, in the work of Aristotle; the “invention,” the choice of a “right topic” was the 
foremost element, ahead of “disposito,” the crafting of narrative, and “elocution,” the 
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actual linguistic expression of the topic”(p. 121) 
Figure 4.1 An example to moral and educative intentions of the ethical regime of images.  Laocoön and 
his sons, Hellenistic original. 200 BC 
 
Therefore, the story becomes the most important part of an art form. The 
representational regime of art values the characters and the general narration of the 
art work, which includes the stories of the characters. In this regime a story can be 
told via various different artistic forms. Therefore, the essence of the poem is the 
story it tells, not the use of the language. Rancière (2009) highlights that “Insofar as 
it is seen as the mere accomplishment of a religious or therapeutic ritual dance is not 
an art … Something else is required to be counted as an art. This something else was, 
until Stendhal's time, called a story” (p. 6). In Rancière’s terminology mimesis is the 
synonym of representation. The representative regime of the arts, which consists of 
threefold relation: mimesis, poetics and aisthesis. Rancière states that it is mimesis 
which distinguishes the artist's know-how from artisans and entertainer. He continues 
“Fine arts were so named because the law of mimesis defined them as a regulated 
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relation between a way of doing – a poesis – and a way of being which is affected by 
it – an aesthesis” (p. 7). Second distinguishing property of this regime is its 
hierarchical classification of different genres of art. The genres in this regime are 
settled depending on the nature of the subject of the story (for instance noble 
characters in noble genres of tragedy). In representative regime of art there are rules, 
categories and hierarchies, which define the genres and subject matter of art. For 
Rancière (1998), this property of the representative regime is analogous to oligarchic 
ordering of society (p. 27). Also specific characters in this regime have to be depicted 
in certain attitudes or behaviours – like princess cannot say this and that words etc. 
Deranty (2010) identifies four different criteria specific to representative regime of 
arts, to define what is proper and what is not:  
whether the actions are depicted correspond to nature of human 
passions in general; weather they conform to the good spirit of the 
people or the main character as reported by the “good authors” (the 
classic of the canon); weather the current audience's sense of decency 
and taste is respected; weather the action and speech follow a pattern 
commensurate with the logic that can be expected, and the logic of the 
particular character. (p. 122-123) 
 
Finally, the representational regime of art privileges language over the visible 
imaginary that supplements it (Rancière & Rockhill, 2006, p. 91). This brings a 
dilemma that, in order to empower the cause-effect relationship of narration and the 
logics of morality, the narration neglects some of the details of the story.  
In the last regime of art, the aesthetic regime, Rancière states that the mimesis 
ends, while figuration does not. The aesthetic regime of art prevailed in Western 
culture for nearly two centuries. After the revolutions and the rise of principle of 
equality, the hierarchical distribution of the sensible of the representative regime of 
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art as well has changed. Meanwhile, the police made up new orders which created 
new hierarchies, therefore art as well, did not become totally egalitarian. However, 
new logic of art inverted the old one: mimesis leaves its place to expression. This 
brings the equality of the represented subjects, the way of representation and to the 
immanence of meaning in things. Finally, in this new distribution of the sensible, 
distinction between art and other activities become ambiguous. Therefore, art gains 
its autonomy in this regime. However, as stated before this autonomy is not absolute; 
“the aesthetic regime of art institutes a relation between … autonomous art and 
heteronymous art, art for art sake and art in the service of politics, museum art and 
street art” (Rancière, 2010. p. 32). By identifying these contradictions as a part of 
distribution of the sensible in modern times, Rancière, cancels them out. The new 
distribution of sensible brings the autonomy of sensory experience. Rancière (2009) 
affirms that there is no conflict between art for art’s sake and political art (p. 34). 
Since the distribution of sensible brings no distinction between art and art object, 
there is no anymore separation of the representative regime of arts. Rancière states 
that the idea of Hegel, Schelling and Hölderlin was to manipulate the free appearance 
of art through a consensus upon how to approach it. Namely, to “render ideas 
sensible, to turn them into a replacement for ancient mythology; in other words, into 
living tissue of experiences and common beliefs in which both the elite and the 
people share”. This is what Rancière called metapolitics, which aims to overcome 
dissensus, by replacing them with the infrastructure of the political scene. The 
distinction between art for art’s sake, sublime of Lyotard and the political art then is a 
conflict only in appearance. The autonomy of art erases the separation between life, 
art, politics and religion. Rancière gives the example of Greek statue, which has been 
made for religious reasons, not as an art form in the specific distribution of the 
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sensible of its time. However, in the aesthetic regime of art, this statue is an artistic 
form because of the autonomy of art. Therefore, now, the artistic forms have become 
forms in the upper level, but in infrastructure there is no difference between them. 
Rancière (2009) reminds us the Soviet painters who transform their works from 
abstract paintings to the artisans of new Soviet life (p. 33). 
Figure 4.2 Kazimir Severinovich Malevich, Black Square, 1915, Oil on Canvas 
 
Deranthy (2010) adds that “famously for Hegel, the power of art to capture a whole 
epoch is a dream gone by, which today is replaced by the prosaic languages of the 
positive sciences and philosophy” (p. 128). In the free play of the art, there is no 
meaning to think a form as if it is the expressions of the owners. The dream of 
German Romantics is invalid now, because the artistic and the historic are linked in 
the aesthetic regime of art. The meaning of objects changes in this regime, and 
common objects become artistic. In the time of metapolitics the hermeneutic of signs 
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is important. “Prosaic” objects become signs from history whose meaning is waiting 
to be solved. The artist now, becomes an archaeologist, who is excavating the artistic 
potential of objects.  
In the aesthetic regime of arts, meaning can be found in every layer of reality but it 
cannot be captured wholly. This is what Rancière calls immanence or logos in pathos, 
or the intelligible meaning in the passive presence. New art is totally active but still 
passive. This is parallel to post-structuralist philosophers; however Rancière focuses 
on not how to read the different meanings but the very existence of the contradiction, 
which takes the art form out of control.  
 
3.2.2 The Ethical Turn in Aesthetics 
It has been said that the ethical turn in politics is the ambiguity in the separation 
between “what is and what ought to be” or “fact and law”, which comes into scene 
after the fall of the Soviets. After the ethical turn the law of the state of exception, 
started to be conceived as if it is a natural one through consensus. The ethical turn is 
signifying dissolution of different points of view or different morals, which is also 
dissolution of the disagreement, namely politics. Under the light of the previous 
section it is possible to say that, this new distribution of sensible brings a new form 
of artistic experience, however this does not mean that it is out of the aesthetic 
regime of arts. The autonomy of image is still on scene, anything can be subject of 
art, and anything can be art in theory. The distribution of the sensible however, like in 
the case of before and after revolution in the Soviets, can create specific forms of art 
in a metapolitical level. Metapolitics of art, which is a result of a specific distribution 
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of the sensible, thus, creates unrepresentable subjects and representation ways in the 
aesthetic regime of arts which presupposes the equality of subject matters. Rancière 
(2002) states:  
In this fashion the opposition of the aesthetic regime of art to the 
representational regime can be ascribed to the sheer opposition of the 
art of the unrepresentable to the art of representation. ‘Modern’ works 
of art then have to become ethical witnesses to the unrepresentable.  
(p. 149) 
 
He (2009) underlines that parallel to the ethical turns reflections on politics, “art and 
aesthetics reflection tend to redistribute themselves between a vision of art whose 
propose is to attend the social bond and another of art as that which interminably 
bears witness to catastrophe” (p. 120). To explain this fact Rancière compares two 
works; one from Chris Burden on Vietnam war, that constructs a monument for 
Vietnamese victims on which arbitrary Vietnamese names from the phone book are 
written. And the second, from Christian Boltansky, which is two large sets of shelves 
that are containing the phone books from all around the world, and visitors can take a 
name and call anybody in the world. According to Rancière (2009) the first example 
monuments the counter movement but the second one is “a space that counts as a 
mimesis of common space” (p. 121). Yesterday, art was giving names to the ones 
whose life is taken by State power, but today art approaches the masses as 
“specimens of humanity”, which are bound together to a large community. The 
ethical turn was the introduction of a body to the population via consensus. Now it 
takes a form in which it “restores lost meaning to a common world or repairs the 
cracks in the social bond” (Rancière, 2010, p. 122). The aim of yesterday’s art was to 
underline the contradictions of the world, however now, art aims to cancel them. It 
works to create consensus and restore it. Yesterdays committed art leaves its place to 
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the art that accepts one moral of the state of exception: “Although, there are 
exceptions now, we are a part of whole that obeys the law” artist says. 
In this respect Rancière focuses on the works of Jean-Luc Godard. He claims that the 
works of Godard before the 80s were a collage that is depicting the clashes in the 
society, especially between the high culture and world of commodity, but after the 
80s they took a form that fuses images. Rancière (2009) affirms that “and what that 
fusion of images simultaneously attest to is the reality of an autonomous world of 
images and its community-building power” like in the case of Histoire(s) du Cinema 
(p. 122).  
What happens to the committed art of counter movements of today then? Any 
attempt to create art of contradictions again, the consensus is able to declare it as 
evil. Thus, it forces the committed artist to a self-censorship, to tune their work to 
single moral of the society. It is not easy to declare the contradictions in the war 
between the Palestine and Israel; the law forces the artist to have a perspective which 
is overvaluing human rights, therefore to have same distance to both sides while 
looking at the glasses of humanitarianism. Human rights that are used as a mean of 
creating consensus, in art as well become a way of creating social bond among all. 
Rancière (2009) states this as “yesterdays polemical violence tends to take on a new 
figure. It gets radicalized as a testimony to the unrepresentable, to endless evil and 
catastrophe”(p.122) Rancière adds that the unrepresentable in aesthetic reflection 
becomes what terror is in political level. The distribution of sensible in today’s 
world, uses unrepresentable to create a consensus, and it prisons the works that are 
issuing these unrepresentable under the name evil. When the police attempts to stop 
the 'violence' of the unrepresentable, then actually art starts to wait for another one 
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and become ethical witnesses to this circle of doing and undoing, evil and justice. 
Unrepresentable indicates an inconvenience between the subject matter of art and its 
means. Rancière gives the example of television series Holocaust (Chomsky M. 
1978) which is describing the henchmen and the victims through fictional bodies. 
The reactions to that movie, according to Rancière, show the pain in the camps is 
unrepresentable by such and such a mean. Therefore, this brings another question to 
art, how to represent the unrepresentable? Consequently, this new task of art 
becomes the norm of modern art. In the representative regime of art, Rancière (2010) 
states, it is possible to depict the Holocaust, because, this regime deals with conflict 
of personalities, their aims and the ways which they are transformed in accordance 
with the logic of situation (p. 125). However, the aesthetic regime of art runs with the 
restrictions of unrepresentability and after the ethical turn this unrepresentable erases 
the committed art. Rancière (2009) states that, this impossibility of representation is 
the lack in the representative regime of arts; the aesthetic regime of arts, on the 
contrary is “dedicated to testifying to the unrepresentable” (p. 127). Therefore, by 
doing so, Rancière opposes postmodern aesthetics; since in the aesthetic regime of 
art, the substance leaves its place to empty moralism. The unrepresentable becomes 
both the border and the substance of the art. The distinction between the modern art 
and postmodern art is at metapolitical level. However, in the core, Rancière (2009) 
underlines that “core linking the autonomy between the autonomy of art to the 
anticipation of a community to come, and therefore linking this autonomy to the 
promise of its own suppression” (p. 127).  
Rancière (2009) states that the avant-garde movements were having this dilemma in 
a different form: on the one hand, they were dreaming of transforming the forms of 
art like constructing the forms of a new world in which art is not separated from 
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reality; on the other hand, they were preserving the autonomy of artistic sphere 
although they inscribe “the unresolved contradiction between the aesthetic promise 
and the realities of oppression in the world” (p.129). Finally, after the fall of the 
Soviets, namely, after the ethical turn these dreams turned into demonstrations of the 
social body, the consensus. Some of them give birth to artists that are designing new 
cities or introducing the art forms to suburbs of cities that Rancière calls the “soft” 
ethical turn. After the ethical turn, the avant-garde dream lost its link to future 
emancipation but instead to “an immemorial and never-ending 
catastrophe”(Rancière, 2009, p.129). Therefore, according to Rancière (2009), what 
is called resistant becomes “nothing but the endless work of mourning” (p. 130). The 
art that aims to recover the social bond in the community then merged the avant-
garde in it, in the mourning the dream of emancipation got lost. 
The ethical turn’s aesthetic and politic dimensions are in a strong relation. The right 
and the fact emerge in one dominant moral in the ethical turn of politics. Parallel to 
that, two figures of avant-garde, struggle for promise of emancipation and prisoning 
of art into its own sphere, merged into one dominant dimension that tries to recreate 
the social bonds of the community. These two faces of ethical turn reproduce each 
other. Moreover, Rancière categorizes the exact changes in aesthetics after the ethical 
turn. Yesterday’s radicality transformed into two different forms; according to this 
categorization the soft ethics of consensus in the result of adaptation of the radicality 
to today’s conditions. And the exact overturning of the radicality gives lead to hard 
ethics of infinite evil or art devoted to the mourning of catastrophe. This ethical 
radicality, before looking for a future revolution as an orientation point of history, but 
now it looks back, for instance to the emergence of Nazi genocide that came to scene 
four or five decades after the discovery of camps (Rancière, 2009, pp.130-140). 
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When the hope of revolution got lost after the collapse of the Soviets, the order of 
events got linked to radicality in history. This historical radical catastrophe become 
the genocide says Rancière (2009), and “only a god could save us” (p. 131).  
The ethical turn is not a necessity of history according to Rancière. The power of the 
ethical turn is its power of transformation. The transformation of forms of thought 
and attitudes which yesterday aimed at bringing about a radical political and/or 
aesthetic change. Thus, the emancipatory potential of arts, after the ethical turn, 
transformed into a way of erasing the dissensuses in the society and restoring 
consensuses parallel to the structure of the police.  
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CHAPTER 4 
CINEMA AFTER THE ETHICAL TURN 
 
 
 
 
 
“It amazes me that they [critics] pay so little attention to the subject matter. 
They are always more interested in style and technique” 
Ken Loach 
 
 
 
4.1 Cinema and Emancipation  
 
Rancière was always interested in films, and wrote Film Fables, in which he explains 
the place of cinema in his politic-aesthetic theory. According to Rancière, cinema is a 
“thwarted fable.” What he means by this is that cinema contains both 
representational regime of arts and the aesthetic regime of arts. On the one hand as 
Bazin speculated, the realism, or the essence of cinema lies beneath its ability to 
record and techniques of long shots, deep focus, through which it invites the 
spectator to an independence of thought. However, narrative ordering techniques like 
montage imposes a hand of the director (Bazin, 1968, p. 35). On the other hand, 
Rancière (2006) gives Epstein as an example and states that “records things as the 
human eye cannot see them, as they come into being, in a state of waves and 
vibrations, before they can be qualified as intelligible objects, people, or events due 
to their descriptive or narrative properties” (p. 2). Therefore, cinema as a 
development of aesthetic regime, invariably reverts the movement because of its 
nature (Rancière, 2006, p. 1). According to Rancière, cinema’s nature is its ability to 
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operate independent from the hand of the artist. On contrast to other plastic arts 
cinema offers passivity and the director tries to thwart this passivity by using 
montage or camera placement etc. In the one hand it is the ultimate medium of the 
modernist dream with its ability to bring the small details of reality, however on the 
other hand, the director forces it to have a fable. This is why Rancière calls cinema 
“thwarted fable.” It belongs to representative regime but because of its very nature, 
cinema constantly thwarts the logic of fable and brings the aesthetic regime on stage.  
When it comes to political cinema Rancière states that:  
Art is not political owing to the messages and feelings that it conveys 
on the state of social and political issues. Nor is it political owing to 
the way it represents social structures, conflicts or identities. It is 
political by virtue of the very distance that it takes with respect to 
those functions. It is political insofar as it frames not only works or 
monuments, but also a specific space-time sensorium, as this 
sensorium defines ways of being together or being apart, being inside 
or outside, in front of or in the middle of, etc. It is political as its own 
practices shape forms of visibility that reframe the way in which 
practices, manners of being, and modes of feeling and saying are 
interwoven in a common sense, which means a ‘sense of the common’ 
embodied in a common sensorium.  
(“ARTicles: Rene -- Rancière -- The politics of aesthetics,” n d, para. 
2) 
 
This paragraph should be considered parallel to the emancipation theory of Rancière. 
Emancipation for Rancière is based on his opposition to Althusser, because of the 
inequality understanding. He writes in Althusser's Lesson (2011), “Althusser needs 
the opposition between the ‘simplicity’ of nature and the ‘complexity’ of history: if 
production is the affair of the workers, history is too complex a thing for them and 
must be left to the specialists: the Party and Theory” (Rancière & Battista, p. 33). If 
the domination is changing its owner from owner of capital to owner of knowledge, 
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than according to Rancière, we are coming to the same place. When it comes to 
political cinema, in accordance with his understanding of equality, Rancière opposes 
the ideas that political cinema is political because of the representation of the social 
structures, conflicts or identities. On the contrary, showing them, or in other words 
teaching the spectator, brings a form of inequality.  
He states “The ethical regime separates artistic simulacra from the true arts, i.e. 
imitations modelled on the “truth” whose final aim is to educate the citizenry in 
accordance with the distribution of occupations in the community” (Rancière 2004,p. 
86). First of all, it is worth to remember what he learned from Joseph Jacotot who is 
“asserting that an ignorant could teach another ignorant what he did not know 
himself , proclaiming the equality of intelligences and calling for intellectual 
emancipation against the standard idea of the instruction of the people (Emancipated 
spectator)” (Rancière, 2009b, p. 3). 
A political film that shows the “truth” assumes there is a spectator; now for Rancière 
(2009b) being a spectator 
means looking at a spectacle. And looking is a bad thing, for two 
reasons. First, looking is deemed the opposite of knowing. It means 
standing before an appearance without knowing the conditions which 
produced that appearance or the reality that lies behind it. Second, 
looking is deemed the opposite of acting. He who looks at the 
spectacle remains motionless in his seat, lacking any power of 
intervention. Being a spectator means being passive. The spectator is 
separated from the capacity of knowing just as he is separated from 
the possibility of acting. (p. 5) 
 
Rancière offers emancipation from this definition of spectator. Emancipation is “the 
process of verification of the equality of intelligence”. The equality of intelligence 
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means that “there is no gap between two forms of intelligence”. From this point, the 
ignorant in a spectacle, which is the spectator, is getting questioned by Rancière 
(2009b).  
But why not turn things around? Why not think, in this case too, that 
it is precisely the attempt at suppressing the distance that constitutes 
the distance itself? Why identify the fact of being seated motionless 
with inactivity, if not by the presupposition of a radical gap between 
activity and inactivity? Why identify “looking” with “passivity” if not 
by the presupposition that looking means looking at the image or the 
appearance, that it means being separated from the reality that is 
always behind the image? Why identify hearing with being passive, if 
not by the presupposition that acting is the opposite of speaking? (p. 
5) 
 
By using his idea on equality of intelligences, Rancière (2009b) speculates:  
Emancipation starts from the opposite principle, the principle of 
equality. It begins when we dismiss the opposition between looking 
and acting and understand that the distribution of the visible itself is 
part of the configuration of domination and subjection. It starts when 
we realize that looking is also an action that confirms or modifies that 
distribution, and that “interpreting the world” is already a means of 
transforming it, of reconfiguring it. The spectator is active, just like 
the student or the scientist: He observes, he selects, he compares, he 
interprets. (p. 6) 
 
Therefore, the political cinema is political not because it teaches to the spectator, but 
instead it is political because it is able to offer another distribution of sensible than 
the police order, which disturbs the current one. Therefore, this approach to 
spectator, changes the meaning of political cinema from an educative one in 
Brechtian sense to an emancipated one, since emancipation is both the emancipation 
of the spectator and the film. 
How can we read the ethical turn in cinema then? The ethical turn is a result of a 
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specific distribution of sensible. It is possible to consider specific movies one by one 
and search for the motives of the ethical turn. The film Children of Men (Alfonso 
Cuarón, 2006) will be analysed under this light in next chapter. However, it is also 
possible to discuss the general tendencies parallel to definition of the ethical turn. 
According to Rancière, there are two branches of ethical turn in aesthetics: first, the 
artist indicates a unity, which is in general the police order in the state of exception, 
and second artist witnesses the catastrophe of today or yesterday.  
 
4.2 Cinema of Consensus  
 
The first tendency is the one, which is opposing the antagonisms in the world. Most 
of the times this unity of one moral is provided by the notion of human rights, which 
will be discussed in detail in the next section. This tendency assumes a bare human 
as a common point of all population, and underlines the violation of the human 
rights, or the rights of bare human. This violation in the movies becomes the knot 
that binds everybody to each other. However, as shown in the section the Ethical 
Turn in Aesthetics, these rights have already lost their fundamental meaning, on the 
contrary become means of making consensus, through which the state of exception 
rises.  
A striking example to such kind of a tendency is the movie In a Better World 
(Susanne Bier, 2010) which is the Oscar winner of 2010 in best foreign language 
film. The movie show two stories one in Africa and the other in Denmark. 
Protagonist of the movie makes choices between the revenge and forgiveness in both 
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of the stories. In both of the cases the protagonist faces with the violation of his right 
and the cruelty of the others. However he chooses to stay silent instead of fighting 
against the violence. Telling two stores permit the movie for a generalization of the 
speech to all the world; we have similar cases in all parts of the world and our side 
should be to stay silent instead of fighting for our rights. The protagonist glorifies the 
bare human who is the innocent and should stay innocent, or bare human. The movie 
gives a strong feeling that, people, where ever they are living, should take the side of 
human being who is in conformity with the police order. Even if there are violence of 
rights, still one cannot use violence, because this puts the one into the side of the 
evil. This approach assumes and recreates a consensus upon the sacredness of bare 
human. It equates the humanitarian approach to life with the state of bare human. 
The list made by Boggs and Pollard in Hollywood and the Spectacle of Terrorism 
(2006) also lists some of the movies like Die Hard (1995), The Rock (1995), that are 
taking the violation of human rights before September 11. as a central issue which 
will be underlined in the next chapter.  
 
4.2.1 After 9/11 
Another point that Rancière stated is the transformation of dream of revolution to 
radicality in history. This is what Rancière means when he says that time started to 
flow through back. When the hope from future got lost, the reference point becomes 
the radicality of past events, and artist structures his work in reference to the 
historical catastrophe. Rancière gives the example of Nazi genocide, and the 
appearance of the genocide in art decades after their acknowledgement. 
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This approach of Rancière reminds Naomi Klein’s argument in her book The Shock 
Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (2008). She states: 
Without a story, we are, as many of us were after September 11, 
intensely vulnerable to those people who are ready to take advantage 
of the chaos for their own ends. As soon as we have a narrative that 
offers a perspective on shocking events, we become reoriented, and 
the world begins to sense again. (p. 458) 
 
Films offer a narrative through which the spectator can reorient himself in front of 
the shocks. This shock is what Rancière calls the radicality of the past. The shock, 
which is an event in Deleusian sense, a breaking with causality, continues with a 
catastrophe. On the one hand what we have is, in Rancière’s terms, an 
unrepresentable: Nazi genocide or for this example, 9/11 attacks. What makes the 
unrepresentable in these events is the moral of the police order which lets the artist to 
represent such and such a topic in only one perspective. In the genocide example the 
horror of the victims is unrepresentable. As Rancière quoted from Lanzmann no 
image can be adequate to the horror of the extermination camp (Rancière & 
Corcoran, 2010, p. 41). The image of the unrepresentable normalizes the 
unrepresentable, consequently, such kind of a thinking bans visibility of some 
images. On the other hand, the shocking event, according to Rancière, creates an era 
of historical catastrophe, from which only god can save us: it is what Agamben states 
as a messianic salvation from the constant catastrophe. When we think about the 
movies after the ethical turn, besides the Nazi genocide, 9/11. bombings become the 
subject of the unrepresentable. The catastrophe after the bombings, which created a 
social body among western societies, also lead to a consensus on the one kind of 
moral of the state of exception. The future revolution that breaks the linearity of 
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events is now the 9/11, a past catastrophe. Time flows through past not future.  
Loin du Vietnam (1967) gives us a good example of this change of the 
unrepresentable after the US bombings. It shows six antiwar movies from six 
directors (Alain Resnais, Claude Lelouch, Jean-Luc Godard, William Klein, Joris 
Ivens and Agnes Varda). The documentary shows Fidel Castro, while stating that a 
guerilla war that has the support of the people is the only force stronger than the new 
technology. Or Godard states on the movie; “I wanted to show everything- revolution 
etc … But we are far away, so the best we can do is to make films – Let Vietnam 
invade us” (Monaco, 2004, p. 203). Obviously this is a political movie that states 
itself in a side which is in a disagreement with the American invasion in Vietnam.  
It is possible to compare Loin du Vietnam with similar attempts that try to oppose 
with American invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. First of all, one should note that the 
protestation against the American invasion to Iraq was nearly comparable with the 
ones against Vietnam. However, in the time of consensus after the 9/11 the directors 
were not able to situate themselves in an obvious opposition with the American war. 
The ways of creating such a consensus will be discussed in detail in the next section. 
However, it is possible to consider the collection of films 11'09'01 – September 11 
(2002) made by different directors from Ken Loach to Alejandro Gonzales Inarritu. 
None of these movies had the motives of Loin du Vietnam, although they also claim 
to be anti-militarist. Only three movies, from Ken Loach, Youssef Chahine and Sean 
Penn were able to bring noticeable critique to the US. Other movies are mostly 
talking about the personal stories of pain that is shared by the US citizens. These two 
movies as well are stating the violence is also coming from the US; however, do not 
place themselves in a part that is in disagreement with the police order, since there is 
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no such a part after the fall of the Soviets. 
Another wave of films after 9/11 is the ones on the American soldiers in their fight 
against what Bush state as “axis of evil”. In most of these movies we are faced with 
soldiers that are trying to protect human life, that are trying to bring justice to the 
world, in fear and chaos of the war zone. Oscar winner The Hurt Locker (Kathryne 
Bigelow, 2008), Restrepo (Tim Hetherington, Sebastian Junger, 2010), Jarhead (Sam 
Mendes, 2005), The War Tapes (Deborah Scranton, 2006) and In the Valley of Elah 
(Paul Haggis, 2007) are example of such kind of movies: showing about soldiers 
fighting against the evil to bring the justice. In most of these movies there is the 
strong sense of bringing justice to these lands. According to Rancière’s point of view, 
this is a part of the catastrophe, the terror of this world. A continuous fight against the 
evil.  
Several books have been published on the films after 9/11 including Rethinking 
Global Security: Media, Popular Culture, and the “War on Terror (eds. Andrew 
Martin and Partice Petro, Rutgers University Press, 2006), Reframing 9/11: Film, 
Popular Culture and “War on Terror” (eds. Jeff Birkenstein, Anna Froula, Karen 
Randell, Continuum, 2010) and The Selling of 9/11: How a National Tragedy 
Become a Commodity (ed. Danna Heller, Palgrave, 2005). These editions are 
focusing on the movies after 9/11 to a great extent. However, Rancière’s approach 
shows how cinema is turning back to representative regime although it is a 
production of aesthetic regime through the unrepresentable. The unrepresentable of 
current times is the attempts to break the social body that has been created in these 
examples by war on terror.  
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4.3. Witnessing the Catastrophe 
In the second tendency in films after the ethical turn, film positions itself in a 
position in which it witnesses the catastrophe of today or yesterday. A police system 
which is like a network and covering all the possible antagonisms itself, inevitably, 
includes all the catastrophe of the world. The police, which bases itself on the 
possibility of catastrophes, works like a machine in which human being is not able to 
breathe. Films show the misery in the police but they cannot come up with an 
antagonism to it, since consensus abolishes all conflicts already. Some examples of 
such kind of a tendency might be Babel (Alejandro Gonzalez Inarritu, 2006) and 
Crash (Paul Haggis, 2004). Both of the movies focus on the interconnectedness of 
things and the misery in the police order. A great system the people are in and 
sadness of the people is showed in the movies but they do not disturb the distribution 
of the sensible. In Babel the problem of the world is the lack of communication. The 
movie shows the great misery of the world and its interconnectedness, however, 
stays in this very point. In the Crash as well, somehow all characters meets with the 
others and there are no villains in the movie. However, there is a misery in the world 
that the movie shows. The way these movies depict the police order is totally 
different from the social realist movies. Lukacs defined realism as a literary mode, 
“in which the lives of individual characters were portrait as part of a narrative which 
situated them within the entire social dynamics of their society” (Lunn, 1984, p. 78). 
Namely, the social realism, which portrays the cruelty of capitalism, imitates the 
social dynamics of the police order. Thus, the existence of the social dynamics, 
which are shaping the stories of the character in the movies, becomes a stage for the 
clash of these dynamics. As Frederic Jameson stated “thus, realism is dependent on 
the possibility of access of the forces of change in a given moment of history”(Writer 
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and Critic, and Other Essays, n d, p. 115) However, in the movies after the ethical 
turn the main motivation is not forces of transformation but the status quo. Lebanon 
(Samuel Maoz, 2009), Waltz With Bashir (Ari Folman, 2008) are two examples that 
Zizek identifies in this kind of tendency.  
Turkish director Aslı Özge made the movie Men on the Bridge (2009), which has 
been shown in many festivals including 32th Festival Internazionale Cinema e 
Donne, in Florence. After the movie Aslı Özge and Emre Erkmen, the 
cinematographer of the movie gave clues on the mind of the artist after the ethical 
turn. 
Aslı Özge stated that she never wanted to make a political movie. The movies that 
she made are in general related to her personal stories. When I asked about the 
motivations of making such kind of a movie, which shows the worlds of three low 
class people that are working on the same bridge, she answered: 
- One of the reasons why I chose Fikret [gypsy character in the movie] and 
turned into fiction is Fikret told me about his experience. While they were 
looking at phones, they throw him out of the shop. This situation made 
me angry.  
Emre Erkmen added: 
- In the political movies in this sense [movies that wants to be political] the 
movie vomits; if you make a move just because he is Kurdish or under 
oppression, then you oppress him one more time. One more time he got 
excluded, one more time he became the citizen of second class. 
Therefore, it ruins the movie as well. Anyway, these kinds of movies 
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never become successful, or become successful only in a part of society. 
If you make a movie on Kurdish issue, only people who are interested on 
that issue watch it. One shouldn't make a movie because he is Kurdish but 
instead because he is what he is. Otherwise, people who are not interested 
in Kurdish issue do not go to watch that movie. There is no point in this. 
The aim is to universalize this job (Kamiloğlu, 01.09.2010, Florance).  
They made movies because of anger to the police order; this is exactly what Rancière 
is talking about while saying witnessing the catastrophe of today. The artist witnesses 
the world and shows the misery. This is a kind of mourning according to Rancière. 
Making a move to show the sadness of the world and try to make it attractable for 
everybody is the film after the ethical turn. 
The approach of Rancière can be traced in the details of quite a lot of movies after 
ethical turn. This should be pointed out that the reflections of the ethical turn can be 
found in the details of movies, even if the main narration does not indicate it. A piece 
of dialogue, world view of a character, might be carrying these reflections, since 
what we can say and what we can see is determined by the distribution of the 
sensible in the times after the ethical turn. 
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CHAPTER 5  
A CASE STUDY : 
Children of Men 
 
 
 
 
"So now what will become of us, without barbarians. 
Those men were one sort of resolution." 
Constantine Cavafy 
 "Waiting for the Barbarians" 
(Cavafy, 2001, p. 93) 
 
 
 
5.1 Dystopia of The End  
 
 
The movie Children of Men (Alfonso Cuarón, 2006) is a dystopia in which people 
are not fertile anymore, and there are pandemics, violence, war, pollution and 
various threats against human life in a catastrophic world. It is possible to focus on 
two different parts in the movie, in order to catch the politics of Rancière: The police 
and the demos in the movie. However, first I would focus on the plot, so it would 
become easier to understand the politics in it.  
The movie opens in a coffee bar where we are able to understand the youngest 
person in the world is dead in Buenos Aires. A few minutes later, the coffee bar 
explodes. From this scene, we understand that death and bombings are quite 
common in this London of the future. The hero of the movie, Theo Faron (Clive 
Owen) is kidnapped by a group of rebels, whose head is his ex-lover, Julian. The 
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group asks for travel papers from Theo in order to smuggle out Kee (Clare-Hope 
Ashitey) from the country. Then, Julian dies and we understand that she has been 
killed by a fraction in the group. Actually she has felt such an occasion before 
getting murdered so she chose Theo to take the papers and told Kee to trust only 
Faron. This point is important because we understand that the main reason of this 
assassination is a conflict inside the rebels group. The reason of the conflict is what 
to do with Kee and the future baby: a fraction of the rebels (the Fishes) wants to use 
this baby as a flag in order to reach the aim, which is freedom in Britain, rights for 
immigrants. However, Julian, the head of the group wants to give the baby to a 
vessel belonging to another organisation called the Human Project. After this point 
the movie becomes hide-and-seek: Faron and Kee are running away from the rebels, 
from government and bullets around in order to catch a ship (or a hope) called 
Tomorrow. They succeed to do so.  
Children of Men draws a world order which is not an alternative world or a 
metaphor, but more likely a possible near future. It is like an exacerbation of today’s 
world. Fisher (2009) states that “what is unique about the dystopia in Children of 
Men is that it is specific to late capitalism” rather than totalitarian dystopias like V 
for Vendetta (Jean McTeigue, 2005)” (p. 1). What we are facing in the movie is not 
like the world of George Orwell’s Animal Farm, it is more like a world at the end of 
capitalism. Therefore, the movie gives us a chance to speculate not only on the 
description of the world in the movie but also on capitalism of today.  
One of the screens in the movie, after showing the scenes of catastrophe from 
different cities of the world (like Paris, Moscow, Kuala Lumpur, Boston etc.) says 
“The world has collapsed; only Britain soldiers on.” There is terror in all around the 
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world but in Britain. During the movie it is not possible to have an idea about what 
is exactly this terror that reigns on the other parts of the world. However, the images 
are showing fires, cries and people in pain. The catastrophe in other parts of the 
world creates massive migration to Britain and the reaction of the government in the 
movie, against the waves of people is to declare all the foreigners illegal. This 
declaration of course, spreads catastrophe to Britain as well. The movie shows us 
foreigners who are thrown out from their houses and caged by the police in the 
suburbs of London. Foreigners are in different colours and screaming in different 
languages. However, capitalism still reigns: it is possible to see franchise coffee bars 
and internment camps together. This is why the movie is on the end of the 
capitalism. The sentence which is attributed to Zizek states that “it is easier to 
imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine the end capitalism.” Last breaths 
of capitalism, which is the imaginable of the movie, seem like the end of the world. 
The British state in Children of Men shrinks to its core military functions, and a 
strictly protected governing place. However, it seems there is still a public order. 
State is still in power with capitalism.  
 
5.2 On the State 
 
The state in Children of Men, is a specific police order. As it has been said before, 
according to Rancière (2004), police is “the set of procedures whereby aggregation 
and consent of collectives is achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution of 
places and roles, and the systems for legitimizing this distribution” (p. 28). This 
 67 
 
description is applicable for Britain in the movie. It is possible to see a specific kind 
of distribution of power, places and roles: Police is powerful, oligarch is small but 
strong. There is no clue about elections, or any other tools of representative 
democracy, however, it seems that the state has the consent of people. British 
citizens are going to their work, to streets and obeying the rule in their close circus. 
Therefore, the natural like order of the police continues with the domination it is 
having. This situation of the state can be explained through archipolitics of Plato 
rather than the parapolitics of Aristotle. We are seeing citizens in their place without 
any claim for democracy. It is possible to observe people working in different 
specific jobs but still without any place for art. Archipolitics does not leave any 
space in which political moment may occur, and this is what we are seeing in the 
movie. Although there is an unjust image of the world, it is not possible to see any 
protestation whatsoever. Even the old activist, Theo, seems totally tuned in the 
police order.  
Agamben's term, the state of exception catches the core of what Rancière calls the 
ethical turn. It identifies the state as a state without borders, since the law includes 
the exceptions as well. Moreover, Agamben states that “not only as private/public, 
but also the house and the city, the exception and the rule, to reign and to govern, 
etc. But in order to understand what is really at stake here, we must learn to see these 
oppositions not as “di-chotomies” but as “di-polarities,” not substantial, but 
tensional” (Raulff, 2004, p. 612). Also he adds that in these dipolarities, the 
government, the rule, and the city become more and more powerful in today’s world. 
In the movie as well, we are not able to see a head of the government or government 
at all. What we are able to see in the spatial time of the movie is a country that is 
ruled by governing rather than reigning. It is worth to remember Deleuze while 
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indicating Kafka (because of The Trial) as the prophet of distributed, cybernetic 
power that is typical of control societies. In The Trial it is not anymore possible to 
talk about a definite acquittal. Actually this is also specific to the archipolitics of 
Plato: everybody does his/her job and bureaucracy become “rule by no one” as 
Arendt said. Even the private space seems like something related to past. We are not 
able to see any scenes related to the house but only to city. The house and private is 
visible only in the world of rebels and old school Jasper, who seems like in outside 
of the police. 
Exception States of today are therefore including the contradictions but these 
contradictions are actually not outside the law. The law brings also other 
contradictions. Alain Badiou observed in 'We live in a contradiction': 
a brutal state of affairs, profoundly inegalitarian - where all  evaluated 
in terms of money alone - is presented to us as ideal. To justify their 
conservatism, the partisans of the established order cannot really call 
it ideal or wonderful. So instead, they have decided to say that all the 
rest is horrible. Sure, they say, we may not live in a condition of 
Goodness. But we're lucky that we don't live in a condition of Evil. 
Our democracy is not perfect. But it's better than the bloody 
dictatorships. Capitalism is unjust. But it's not criminal like Stalinism. 
We let millions of Africans die of AIDS, but we don't make racist 
nationalist declarations like Milosevic. We kill Iraqis with our 
airplanes, but we don't cut their throats with machetes like they do in 
Rwanda, etc. (“CABINET // On Evil: An Interview with Alain 
Badiou,” nd) 
 
What the police is advertising in the movie, is the chaos in other cities: Yes, we are 
not perfect, but in other cities terror reigns. This is what Badiou observes: “our 
democracy is not perfect. But it's better than the bloody dictatorships.” In its 
extreme, this speech brings the justification to all kinds of exceptions. Yes there are 
cages all around in the move but government LCD screens are constantly reminding, 
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we are better than other cities. Only we are up. You have to take what we are giving 
you under the name of order.  
While showing possible catastrophes of the worst, the police order also implies the 
possible repetition of these facts. Rancière (2009) exposes what Badiou points out to 
be one of the characteristics of the ethical turn: “So, there are two features that 
characterize the ethical turn. The first is a reversal of the flow of time: – progress, 
emancipation, or the other – is replaced by that turned towards the catastrophe 
behind us. But it is also a levelling out of the very forms of catastrophe”(p. 119) This 
catastrophe might be the Nazi State or the 9/11 attacks at different levels. In Lyotard 
(1992) a spatio-temporal repetition may be built into cultural texts, such as music, 
and in Paul Ricoeur (1990) the literary plot is in its essence repetitive. Repetition in 
the case of the ethical turn becomes a repetition of possible disaster, therefore 
repetition of the same anxiety again and again. This is exactly what Rancière means 
by permanent terror. It has been said before, terror is not only the crime of a singular 
event but it is also “the fear that similar event might recur”(Rancière, 2009, p.114). 
Efraim Sicher and Natalia Skradol (2009) state that: 
After the worst has already happened (the Bhophal disaster in India, 
Chernobyl, 9/11, or the SARS epidemic), the future can be imagined 
as a replay of disaster scenarios, in which we compulsively repeat past 
imagining of the future. This is a distinctly postmodernist marker of 
an end to the Western tradition of looking forward to the terminal 
transformation of the world either into a prelapsarian edenic state (a 
regression to a primeval paradise) or into a radically new political 
reality (a revision of history or rewriting the future). (p. 159) 
 
Now, the police order justifies itself always through the past, however this 
justification also puts the past into the place of future. State of exception becomes a 
different form of past catastrophes, while taking these catastrophes as a touchstone. 
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This is why Agamben was defining the extermination of the European Jews as a 
nomos of today’s society. He adds that Guantanamo is not that different from 
extermination camps of Nazi State (Raulff, 2004). In this aspect, 9/11 can be the last 
big thing of today’s societies. Sicher and Skradol (2009) declare that “What 9/11 has 
shown is that the relationship of the real and the imagined in dystopian fiction has 
been reversed, since hypermediated image has eclipsed the event and fiction has 
become lived experience” (p. 153). Fisher (2009) states that in Children of Men “the 
focus shifts from the Next Big Thing to the last big thing - how long ago did it 
happen and just how big was it?” (p. 4). Adorno (1990) states that “The Holocaust 
has imposed a new categorical imperative on human beings: ‘to arrange their 
thoughts and actions so that Auschwitz will not repeat itself, so that nothing similar 
will happen’” (p. 365). The last big thing is the death of the youngest child in the 
movie. After this, an atmosphere of catastrophe dominates the society: all the people 
in the movie are listening to the news carefully and crying. This event is like 
recurrence of the start of infertility in the movie. The society always looks through 
past. There is no dream about future; the lack of protestations or people with 
different ideals comes parallel with this flow of time through past. The law puts itself 
as the only rule which can protect the society from the repetition of the evil, 
repetition of the last big thing. This is what Rancière calls eternal justice: this infinite 
recreation of the eternal evil and the justice making possible the consensus.  
In different people we are able to see a certain tendency to religion in the movie. 
There are different Christian organizations in the movie, who consider infertility as a 
punishment of the God. They are gathering in public places. We are also seeing the 
raise of superstition and religious meditation in the movie. Belief to destiny is really 
strong, even in the mind of Jasper, who is living in the forest, out site of the city. 
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This proliferation of the superstition and religion is related to the loss of hope, hope 
for a different world. This fact is quite similar to today’s democracies in the form of 
the loss of utopias. While Francis Fukuyama stated the collapse of the Soviet bloc as 
"the end of history", it was a euphemism for the end of utopias. According to 
Frederic Jameson, utopias have a tendency to raise “transitional periods,” when 
major social changes are accompanied by a kind of political stasis, where the 
political will or means are lacking to give shape and direction to the changes. 
However, after ethical turn, the law started to act like above all. The separation, the 
distinction between “what is and what ought to be” is getting lost. What ought to be 
is the very fundamental question for utopias. Different morals, that are supposed to 
create politics, merge into one moral of the state through consensus after the ethical 
turn. The law acts as if it is the created through the consensus. If there are no 
different morals, then there is no place for utopias as well. Consensus, in the time of 
the ethical turn, also makes people believe that there is no need for a different moral. 
This is why Rancière underlines a certain tendency to nihilism. There is no need for 
utopia. If we consider the conditions of emergence of utopia that is stated by 
Jameson, it is possible to say that the police order also acts as if there is no transition 
even in the case of a natural disaster like infertility in Children of Men. Because, 
actually, the police strictly convinces us the transition is always in the police, since 
the law seems nearly like natural. Utopia as well, become possible only under the 
law, than, it is not a utopia anymore but mere wishes. This belief in the universal law 
is the very reason that creates the loss of utopia. Jameson (2007) observes: 
“what is crippling is not the presence of an enemy but rather the 
universal belief that the historic alternatives to capitalism have been 
proven unviable and impossible, and that no other socio-economic 
system is conceivable, let alone practically available. The Utopians 
not only offer to conceive of such alternate systems; Utopian form is 
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itself a representational meditation on radical difference, radical 
otherness, and on the systematic nature of the social totality, to the 
point where one cannot imagine any fundamental change in our social 
existence which has not first thrown off Utopian visions like so many 
sparks from a comet.” (p. xii) 
 
In the world without utopias, without a hope, meaning of life got lost in the mind of 
people. Jasper asks to Theo, what he did for his birthday. Theo answers “wake up, 
felt like a shit, went to work, felt like a shit”. Jasper comments, “that is called hang 
over.” “At least”, says Theo, “with a hangover I feel something.” In another point 
Kee talks about her pregnancy to Theo. When she felt the kick of the baby, Kee says 
“I felt like I am alive.” She was not feeling alive till the baby. People in the streets 
are not talking; there is no single cheerful character. People are using antidepressants 
and a suicide kit called Quietus with the advertisement “there has been no cases of 
anyone surviving”. All these drugs are given by the government. All this shows that 
the police order is not caring about the life of people anymore but in how they live. 
Police is organized in a way that actually it is based on management of how people 
will live, like biopolitics of Foucault. Foucault (2003) affirms that “sovereignty took 
life and let live. And now we have the emergence of a power that I would call the 
power of regularization [that] consists in making live and letting die" (p. 247). In 
Children of Men as well, the police chooses who will live and die between British 
and foreigners. Foreigners do not have a chance for life for the sake wellbeing of the 
state. Also British citizens, who have no hope or will to live, can kill themselves. The 
state makes people believe that these all are for the sake of community. Foucault 
(2003) states that the ultimate tendency of biopolitics is to control “relations between 
the human race, or human beings insofar as they are a species” (p. 245). 
Consequently, biopolitics also nurtures a growth in racism. Foreigners are destined to 
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death in the Britain of Children of Men. The huge masses of immigrants are 
empoweres the racism, since the police has to find a way for the order to continue. 
Foucault (2003) states that "[Racism] is primarily a way of introducing a break into 
the domain of life that is under power's control: the break between what must live 
and what must die" (p. 254). The foreigners do not have right to live for the order 
than. Police introduces this break: it says in order to let British people live, others 
have to die. Thus it “make[s] the relationship of war function in a way that is 
completely new and that is quite compatible with the exercise of biopower" 
(Foucault, 2003, p. 255). Racism gets integrated to the system without problem. In 
Children of Men as well integration of racism into the police is observable. In the old 
newspapers stick on the wall of Jasper's house, the headlines are stating “All 
Immigrants are Illegal”. When foreigners are taken to camps and destined to misery, 
there is no demonstration against, or any democratic movement. In the discussion in 
between the Fishes, Theo offers them to make the existence of a new baby public. 
However, Fishes replies to him, in this case government would take the kid and make 
it public as if the baby is from a British lady. They would never let such a 
manifestation that declares jugies are humans too. This is the state of exception; all 
citizens take this new era as if it has to be like this. All foreigners have to go to 
prisons as the police order says. The mechanic sound from the speakers in the movie 
say: “they are your neighbour, they are your relatives, do not protect the illegal 
immigrants!”. Neighbours of Brits become an illegal immigrant in the day after. This 
is what happened in Nazi State. Foucault (2003) states that "The Nazi state makes the 
field of life it manages, protects, guarantees, and cultivates in biological terms 
absolutely coextensive with the sovereign right to kill anyone, meaning not only 
other people, but also its own people" (p. 260). This is intrinsic in the ethical turn; 
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police which exists with the consensus, turns this consensus on the minorities that it 
wants to eliminate. The consensus of the people can be hold easily by using racism 
which states that for the wellbeing of the majority, the minority is the problem. The 
scene in the movie is looking like what is happening in Europe, after the Arab 
revolutions of 2011 and war in Libya. Thousands of people are trying to reach to 
Italy and other countries of Europe. All Italians and Europeans know that people are 
dying while trying to come to the coasts of their countries. However, there is no 
strong movement to protect the immigrants in Europe. The police states that for the 
wealth of the society, these immigrants are danger. The police prevent people to think 
about the order itself instead, it creates states of exception and states of 
contradictions. The consensus of the population to the naturalness of the law lets the 
police to do so, since there is no other alternative. Theo says to Jasper, “world went 
to shit, even if fertility comes back”. This words show the possibility of only one 
police order in the mind of Theo. The existing neoliberal world order collapsed, we 
can not build it again; therefore, there is no way of other possible other ways of 
living, not even another police order. Without the police order, there is only 'shit', 
according to Theo. The ethical turn has only one moral, there is no other ways of 
dreaming, other ways of believing what is and what ought to be. Thus, when we have 
collapsed what we have is nothing but a catastrophe. When law diminishes, there is 
nothing to put instead.  
This fact reminds the mirror stage of the Lacanian theory. Mirror stage in Lacan 
defines first time the infant faces his mirror image. Magrini underlines that the mirror 
phase  
is the point at which the self-image of the child, fostered and nurtured 
through maternal identification, is disrupted by the unwelcome 
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intrusion of language, as a direct result of the child’s encounter with 
the paternal (phallic) Other. Nevertheless, this agonizing “disruption,” 
which exposes the child’s former notion of a unified personality as 
illusory, is a necessary stage in the process of socialization, with its 
venerable principles of communication (“OTHERZINE : issue 10,” n 
d para. 3)  
 
This first encounter with the language creates a distance between the child and the 
social order. This encounter sets up a difference between the self and the parent and 
the self and society. This gap is like the gap between Theo and the society after the 
catastrophe. Before Theo was a piece of the police order, like the infant and the 
mother. However, then Theo feels a distance between him and the global society. 
Although he is obeying to the rules of the national police order, he feels a distance 
between him and the former international society. Collapse of the international police 
order works like facing with the language of the kid Theo was already a part of the 
international police order, however, now, he is totally distant to new form of society. 
Since, after the ethical turn, the law which rules to everything, it's nonexistence in 
some areas of the world is like losing this material relation with it. Therefore the gap 
in a situation of disagreement is visible from both sides of the conflict.  
It has been stated that the movie is starting with the bombing of a coffee shop in the 
city centre. Theo asks to Jasper who might be responsible of the bombing. Jasper 
answers, “every time one of our politicians is in trouble, a bomb explodes”. It is 
possible to approach this fact with the need for an endless terror in order to maintain 
current police order, since police order raises from the idea of infinite evil and 
justice. Bombs that are exploding time to time create a feeling of common faith like 
in the case of last big thing. Big disasters create a social body who has right to look 
for infinite justice in consensus. Same function for the bombings: they create a 
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common fear and a common consensus to justify trials to stop these feelings by any 
mean. One of the members of the Fishes in Children of Men says to Theo: “we do not 
bomb, that is what they [government] do to spread fear”. Community believes that 
these bombings are because of the evil without a moral, consequently, “infinite 
justice than takes on its humanist shape as the necessary violence required to 
exorcise trauma in order to maintain the order of community” (Rancière, 2009, 
p.113). When the society believes there is an evil which pops up out from nowhere 
(without a moral), then the British society can justify the caged and beaten foreigners 
in Children of Men. This is the very reason that racists believe that there is an inborn 
evil in the people they want to exterminate. Jews in Nazi State or immigrants in 
Europe can be examples who are carrying the inborn evil. Racism comes with the 
idea that the others, has something missing to be a citizen. In order to stop the evil, 
terror starts, “which by definition never stops for beings who must endure the trauma 
of birth” (Rancière, 2009, p. 114). In the state of exception police order needs these 
bombings or at least the very possibility of bombings. The probability of these 
bombings works as a tool to create consensus upon the reactions of Government. 
This fact has two facets: first the community feels like a victim of the same disaster, 
so it is unified again; second the community feels the same responsibility to stop the 
violence. When we think of the 9/11 bombings not only US citizens but also all 
western society felt as if they are the victim. The responsible was first Al-Quaida, 
however in following years we witnessed the accusation to all fundamentalist 
Muslims. More conservatives started to claim being Muslim is the problem. 
Consensus on the need for justice used by the western politicians and armies of 
coalition were able to commit violent attacks against innocents, under the claim of 
bringing justice and restoring the international order. This is why a place like 
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Guantanamo was able to exist. When it comes to exception people do not ask 
questions, the fact loses its meaning, instead the law rules. Theo’s questions to 
members of Fishes show this situation: Theo constantly accuses them for bombings 
and shows them an old event as a proof. However, Fishes tell him that they are not 
bombing for years now. In fact, the ignorance of Theo is showing the success of the 
propaganda of the government. In Children of Men, the police order is standing with 
the help of the bombings whose only responsible is the government. As a last point it 
is worth to remind some people like a group of scientist in Purdue University claims 
that US government is responsible for 9/11.(“Purdue creates scientifically based 
animation of 9/11 attack,” n d)  
 
5.3 The Fishes 
 
One of the Fishes in the movie says to Theo: “Fishes fight for equal rights for every 
immigrant in Britain”. This claim is very fundamental for the creation of first a 
disagreement, which leads to politics. Rancière (2007) was stating that the essence of 
equality is to “undo the supposed naturalness of orders and to replace it with the 
controversial figures of division” (p. 32). The naturalness of the order is the racist 
British police, which bars foreigners and abandon them to misery in camps. Any 
claim of equality to undo this police order creates the dissensus. However, what is 
important in here is the method of this claim: according to Rancière violence is not a 
method because of its unequal character. Violence, as a method of communication 
with the domination of police, aims to reverse the distribution of power. Any 
violence against civilians then actually tries to force them to acknowledge the power 
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of the rebels. However, a claim for equality cannot use violence as a mean, because, 
as May (2007) stated, if those who have no part are to see themselves as equal to 
those who have a part, then they must also see those who have a part as equal to 
them (p. 34). 
If the claim for equality is two-sided, then exposing the ones who have a part to 
violence, via bombing does not make sense. May (2007) adds that “What 
nonviolence can achieve is something else: not a reversal of power, but an effacing 
of the terms in which a context of power has been conceived” (p. 35). In Children of 
Men, the Fishes start to create dissensus in the police order only when they change 
their method from bombings to talking with people. One of the Fishes in the movie 
states that “we stopped bombing and we start speaking to people”. Rancière states 
that political dissensus “is a conflict about who speaks and who does not speak, 
about what has to be heard as the voice of pain and what has to be heard as an 
argument on justice.”(As cited in Bowman & Stamp, 2011, p. 1). Rancière was 
starting from Aristotle, he asserts that “dissensus is slaves understand language but 
don’t possess it”. The Fishes then, after choosing the method of speaking instead of 
bombing, what they made was a presupposition of equality. Before, by bombing 
public places, although in one hand they were trying to show their power to the 
society, on the other hand, it was a declaration of despair, it was the voice of pain. 
When they started to talk with people, they started to posses the language. This was a 
claim for their place in the society, their share from the visible and audible. Also such 
a claim instead of asking for share from the distributor, accepts this share as a 
presupposition. However it the case of bombing, what is on stage is instead of 
claiming what they already should have, a demand of having a share from the 
distribution from the distributor, or police. 
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However, government of course does not let them to change the distribution of the 
sensible. Police reacts against all possible treats against the order. Moreover, after the 
ethical turn, police uses its ability to manipulate the facts. In the one hand it shows 
the possible threats as if they are from a moral of evil. On the other hand, they 
manipulate the speech of the others; like the example in the movie, they blur what 
the rebels are saying by using old bombings. They again and again put them on trial 
in front of the moral of social body. Since the difference between the fact and the law 
got disappeared, police can manipulate both the fact and the law in an ambiguous 
area. They can create facts, like bombings, and judge the rebels. The fact becomes 
the law, and the law becomes the fact after the ethical turn. 
The police has to cut the voice of the demos, because if they have a voice then they 
take a name. Rancière (2004) states “Whoever the nameless can not speak”(p. 23), 
like the slaves for Aristotle. If somebody has a name, then he/she becomes equal with 
others who are having a name or a part in the distribution of the sensible. Actually 
the word terrorist is used for this sake as well; first the word terrorist get filled with a 
lot of bad signifiers, like lawless murderers, baby killers or mad fundamentalist, then 
the police shows the crimes of the others again and again. Therefore, media becomes 
fundamentally important for the police order. This point becomes interesting for 
various thinkers. Jürgen Habermas (1991) states that “the world fashioned by the 
mass media is a public sphere in appearance only” (p. 171). The work of Herman and 
Chomsky (2002), Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media 
also discusses the role of media in consent making. In the case of terrorists, the state 
draws a picture of them as if they are not human with speech and voice but a demon. 
Boggs and Pollard (2006) writes on the appearance of the terrorist in Hollywood:  
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the demonized Other appears as a monolithic culture of thuggish male 
warriors who relish violence, directed mostly against innocent 
civilians, and who lack motives beyond hatred and jealousy. Despite 
their lack of intellectual sophistication and political strategy, however, 
such warriors are depicted as a grave threat to the very foundations of 
civilized society. (p. 347) 
 
Boggs and Pollard also enlisted the other films with image of demonized 
terrorist in their book Hollywood and the Spectacle of Terrorism (2006) till 
2002: 
 Navy Seals (1990), American Ninja 4: The Annihilation (1991), 
Patriot Games (1992), Chain of Command (1993), True Lies 
(1994), Under Siege 2 (1995), Die Hard with a Vengeance (1995), 
The Rock (1995), Executive Decision (1996), G. I. Jane (1997), 
Air Force One (1997), The Peacemaker (1997), The Siege (1998), 
The Sum of All Fears (2002). 
 
In the case of Children of Men as well, the movie is depicting a part of the 
Fishes with a certain demonization. What divides the Fishes in this aspect is 
humanitarianism of some of them. Next section will focus on the analysis of 
this aspect. 
 
5.4 Humanism as a Mean of Consensus 
 
Slavoj Zizek published an article in the blog of London Review of Books, on the 
preference of academy between Kathryn Bigelow’s The Hurt Locker (2008) over 
James Cameron’s Avatar (2009). He was stating that “The Hurt Locker presents the 
US army in a way which is much more finely attuned to its own public image in our 
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time of humanitarian interventions and militaristic pacifism”. He was also putting Ari 
Folman’s animated documentary Waltz With Bashir and Samuel Maoz’s Lebanon 
into the same side with The Hurt Locker and criticizing these movies as “ideology at 
its purest: the focus on the perpetrator’s traumatic experience enables us to obliterate 
the entire ethico-political background of the conflict”(“Green Berets with a Human 
Face LRB blog, n d, para. 1). What Zizek is criticizing in his essay may be called 
zooming to the victim human and the sacrificing other, in order not to show the 
whole picture of the conflict. These movies are forcing us to choose life of human if 
we are in between two sides of the war, which can also be a form of disagreement. 
The point is that the side of the human life, side of the ones that are trying to protect 
human rights seems like protecting the right to live or the “infinite justice”. Although 
this emphasis on human rights itself has already a side, these movies show it as a 
subject of an ultimate consensus.  
What we see in Children of Men is the conflict between two sides in Fishes upon 
what to do with the baby to born. Fishes are in a disagreement with the police for a 
better world: a world that gives equal rights to immigrants, to others, and a world 
which shares the welfare. However, there is another disagreement in between the 
Fishes; what to do with the kid. One part wants to make him a flag for their aim, for 
the equality between immigrants and British. The other part, including the 
protagonist of the movie, Theo, supports to give the new born baby to the Human 
Project in order secure his life.  Finally, the movie puts the first part of the conflict on 
the side of “bad” and the second part on the side of “good”. However, this distinction 
upon the life of the kid is quite problematic. 
 Alain Badiou gives a new approach to the issue of human rights, and the idea 
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of Evil that lies beneath it. According to Badiou, modern understanding of ethics is 
the main reason of the creation of a new understanding of universal human rights. He 
(2002) states that “ethics is conceived here both as an a priori ability to discern Evil 
(for according to the modern usage of ethics, Evil – or the negative – is primary: we 
presume a consensus regarding what is barbarian), and as ultimate principle of 
judgement, in particular political judgement: good is what intervenes visibly against 
an Evil that is identifiable a priori. Law itself, first of all law against Evil” (p. 8). 
Therefore according to Badiou, modern ethics that makes the law exist is actually 
based on the idea of Evil, the negative of Good. What makes the law is primarily the 
existence of the Evil and it presupposes a certain kind of consensus in defining what 
the Evil is. He (2002) highlights that this approach always considers human in its 
pure animal form, and he adds that “ethics thus defines man as a victim”. Therefore 
this contemporary understanding of Ethics brings the idea of universal human rights. 
According to Badiou, this universal human rights understanding is then always far 
from the very nature of the situations because it always “ethically” tries to protect the 
right of the victim-man. Sam Gillespie states that according to Badiou, “ethics 
simply presumes a vague foundation on which judgements concerning singular 
situations are to be made. Since it always at an indeterminate distance from the 
situation, ethics can only ever be limiting or restrictive”(Brassier, 2001, p. 260). 
Moreover, Badiou states that capitalism is the main winner of this kind of an 
understanding of human rights: “who cannot see that this ethics which rests on the 
misery of the world hides, behind it's victim-Man, the good-Man, the white-Man?”. 
This approach of Badiou is linked to Rancière’s. It has been said that according to 
Rancière (2009) after fall of Soviet, human rights became the “ostensible basis for a 
new national consensuses could also serve as a basis for a new international order” 
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(p. 117). This attitude of overvaluing human rights became a subject for the creation 
of an international consensus, which helps to create a public body.  
In the case of Children of Men, Kee and her baby are the victims. Ethics in the movie 
says that these victims should be protected according to their basic rights. One can 
not neglect the rights of the mother and the child for any aim. Even the name of the 
hope for their salvation is ironic: the Human Project. What Badiou and Rancière 
observe as a symptom of the ethical turn is visible in the movie: the baby and the 
mother are the symbols of “victim-Man, the good-Man, the white-Man”. All the 
ethics that make the choice of Faron plausible is based on this understanding: human 
is a victim, and he has to be protected against the Evil. This is the ethical base that, 
according to Badiou, creates the human rights in today's world.  
Faron, in Children of Men, never uses a weapon, but his courage. He never hurts 
others even for the sake of his aim, to protect Kee. Film gives the impression that he 
is fighting for the good, the human life in its very basic form. In this point it is 
possible to turn back to the argument of Zizek “humanitarian interventions and 
militaristic pacifism”. Kee is actually the most crucial weapon for both rebels and the 
government. However, the hero is choosing a military pacifism and “ethical” fight 
for the life of the baby.  
Of course there is no way of knowing what will happen if the baby is used for the 
aim of Fishes and if a new distribution of the sensible comes into scene. In this point 
the politics of Rancière is getting close to Deleuze. In the case of Rancière, political 
action is not foreseeable because new distributions of sensible always creates new 
possibilities for a new form of political action. Chesney (2010) states that political 
action for Rancière “is always in a sense unanticipated, since the notion of political 
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agency and action is always at stake. And a new partition of the sensible or the polis 
always results which in turn creates new possibilities of action and understanding 
this is in fact a point of very close contact between Deleuze’s thought and 
Rancière’s.”(p. 33). However, for Deleuze there is no presupposition for the 
emergence of politics which is equality in the philosophy of Rancière. For Deleuze 
new configurations create new deterritorializations or new lines of flight, which is 
totally non-dialectical. In “68 Did Not Take Place”, Deleuze (2007) writes:  
In historical phenomena such as the revolution of 1789, the 
Commune, the revolution of 1917, there is always one part of the 
event that is irreducible to any social determinism, or to causal chains. 
Historians are not very fond of this aspect: they restore causality after 
the fact. Yet the event is itself a splitting off from, or a breaking with 
causality; it is a bifurcation, a deviation with respect to laws, an 
unstable condition which opens up a new field of the possible. (p. 
233)  
 
The baby in the hands of Fishes may open up new fields of possible or new 
distributions of sensible. The ultimate aim of Fishes, equality, makes it a political 
action in Rancières sense, without it depending on how the movement will end.  
The movie identifies the first part among Fishes with violence and the other part with 
pacifism of being a victim. Therefore this fact comes like an obstacle for the 
subjectification of Fishes. When they were fighting with the claim of equality, they 
were able to become a subject; however victim part of Fishes does not have such a 
claim. They are just victims that are exposed to the violence of police order and the 
first part of the Fishes. This is where the movie is creating consensus on what is good 
and what is bad: through the use of basic human rights which is a result of the ethical 
turn. The movie is creating a kind of consensus in the mind of spectators throughout 
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the choice of the heroes: the political distinction between different camps of the 
conflict becomes an ethical one finally. Then, the movie is creating a kind of 
consensus with the spectator upon the life of the victims. Consequently, human rights 
become a tool for the elimination of the political. Rancière claims that consensus on 
human rights is a good example of creation of consensus by the police order: they are 
constructed on egalitarian rhetoric, but current politics shows that they become just a 
tool of legitimization of the politics of dominant power. Zizek states the misuse of 
human rights as “the “right to privacy”— the right to adultery, done in secret, where 
no one sees me or has the right to probe into my life. The “right to pursue happiness 
and to possess private property’’— the right to steal (to exploit others). ‘‘Freedom of 
the press and of the expression of opinion’’— the right to lie. ‘‘The right of the free 
citizens to possess weapons’’— the right to kill” (“Slavoj Zizek - How to Read Lacan 
- From Che vuoi? to Fantasy: Lacan with Eyes Wide Shut,” n d, para. 5). 
This process of the creation of consensus brings a kind of depoliticization. This is 
what Chantal Mouffe (2005) in her work On the Political is trying to explain. “Yes, 
after the fall of Soviets a change through the protection of human rights comes into 
scene but this change is not bringing prosperity, peace” (p. 1). Her claim is “contrary 
to what post-political theorists want us to believe, what we are currently witnessing 
is not the disappearance of the political in its adversarial dimension but something 
different. What is happening is that nowadays the political is played out in the moral 
register. In other words, it still consists in a we/they discrimination, but the we/they, 
instead of being defined with political categories, is now established in moral terms” 
(p.1). This is what Rancière is defining as Ethical Turn. 
Badiou (2002) objects to this approach to ethics after the ethical turn,: “No! You are 
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forgetting the active subject, the one that intervenes against Barbarism! ... we are 
dealing with an animal whose resistance, unlike that of a horse, lies not in his fragile 
body but in his stubborn determination to remain what he is that is to say precisely 
something other than a victim, other than a being for death, and thus: something 
other than a mortal being”. Badiou offers a new kind of ethics which is based not on 
the victimhood of the Man, but on his power to resist. The very fundamental fear of 
modern ethical view, the death, and therefore, the protection of life, would not be 
anymore the main concern. Therefore a new kind of human rights or rights of man is 
possible : 
If rights of Man exist, they are surely not rights of life against death, 
or rights of the survival against misery. They are the rights of 
Immortal [in resistance in Badiou], affirmed in their own right, or the 
rights of the Infinite, exercised over the contingency of suffering and 
death. The fact that in the end we all die, not only dust remains, in no 
way alters Man's identity as immortal at the instant in which he 
affirms himself as someone who runs counter to the temptation of 
wanting-to-be-animal to which circumstances may expose him. And 
we know that every human being is capable of being immortal- 
unpredictably, be it in circumstances great or small, for truths 
important or secondary. (Badiou, 2002) 
 
From this new understanding of ethics and human rights, it is expected our heroes in 
Children of Men, not to try to protect the powerless victim but on the contrary, to 
mobilize her in order to protect rights of Man. Opposition to the dominant, should be 
the main motivation of Kee and Faron. The movie is zooming not on the main 
political struggle between the dominant and the resistant, but on the conflict of the 
rebels, and showing this as if it is related to an ethical right and wrong, which is 
constructed by the neoliberal police order after the fall of Soviets. Therefore, the 
movie is reproducing the dominant ideology and its discourse that aims 
depoliticization and condemnation of political resistance.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Obezler Terörist Olamaz ( Obeses can't be terrorist ) Nalan Yırtmaç 
 
 
 
Jacques Rancière, with his unique definition of politics, shows the relation between 
politics and aesthetics. Politics and aesthetics both effect and are affected by the 
distribution of the sensible. Theories of Rancière are based on an axiom of equality. 
This emancipation theory does not only look for a political emancipation but also 
shapes itself as a piece of this emancipation and presupposition of equality. Moreover 
such a theory brings emancipation from the distribution of sensible of arts, because of 
the relation between art and politics. This emancipation theory struggles against 
domination of the police order and also the domination of the knowledge. It calls for 
new configurations of the social and political relations, education and art. 
In the first body chapter of the thesis, I have focused on the roots of the theories of 
Jacques Rancière. The main aim was to give a general overview of his political 
theories, in order to develop following sections. As a main motive, the first chapter
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 has focused on the relations between police and demos and finally it developed the 
conditions of emergence of politics. 
In the third chapter, which is the second body chapter, I have focused on the term the 
ethical turn in two different perspectives: the ethical turn in politics and the ethical 
turn in aesthetics. This section based on the main article that Rancière discusses the 
ethical turn, however, at the same I have tried to clarify the general aesthetic theory 
of Rancière and different thinkers that he mentions in the main text. Also in this 
chapter I have tried to show the connections of the term ethical turn with the political 
theory of Jacques Rancière.  
In the fourth chapter I have analyzed the ethical turn in cinema. To do so I have 
explained the ideas of Rancière on cinema and tried to combine it with the notions 
that he is using in the main article of the ethical turn. I have tried to categorize 
movies depending on these notions and find similar points among movies that 
resembles with these points.  
In the last chapter I have tried to combine what is discussed in previous chapters in a 
case study of Children of Men. This discussion of Children of Men enabled me to 
comprehend and conceptualized not only the movie but also the theories of Jacques 
Rancière. Also this reading of the movie gave me chance to integrate theories of 
different thinkers to the ones of Rancière. In the second section of this chapter I have 
focused on the structure of police in the dystopia of Children of Men. In the last 
section the focus was on the demos, consensus and infinite justice. I have tried to 
uncover the use of human rights as a means of consensus making. 
The perspective of the this work identifies the regimes of art which are results of 
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certain changes in the distribution of the sensible in the world. However this regimes 
are very broad views on the history of art; rather this work shows that it is possible to 
read the motives of the certain distribution of the sensible even in a single movie. If 
the political is to create disturbances in the political order and the distribution of the 
sensible, political movies should as well. However, it does not mean to witness to the 
catastrophe of the world but to depict it in other words that does not appropriate for 
the police order. The concept of the ethical turn shows that even in the aesthetic 
regime of arts there are unrepresentables and the ways of representing such and such 
a topic. Therefore, it is possible not to do so, which brings the political into the 
cinema. Even Children of Men, which is an appreciated movie with its critical 
position, actually represents what is representable. Therefore the perspective of 
Rancière shows that still there is a place for the political, or for antagonisms, 
although the current police order tries to show there is no meaning of it, through 
consensus and the infinite evil.  
The approach of Rancière that is examined in this work gives us a thorough study of 
the relation between politics and cinema; which does not only show how this two 
relate to each other but also, the conditions of the emergence of a political cinema. 
Answer of Rancière to the question “what is politics?” become an answer to the “what 
is political cinema?”. Secondly, this study shows how cinema and politics are getting 
shaped by the same distributions in the society, and how it is possible to read these 
distributions through cinema. And finally, this study underlines a general tendency in 
the cinema after the fall of Soviets or the ethical turn. This tendency is to create a 
consensus against the “evil” and witness the world in catastrophe.  
The approach of Rancière to aesthetics and politics may seem pessimistic, but he 
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(2002) explains why he is not:  
In sketching out these entropic scenarios of the politics of aesthetics, 
may seem to propose a pessimistic view of things. That is not at all 
my purpose. Undeniably, a certain melancholy about the destiny of art 
and of its political commitments is expressed in many ways today, 
especially in my country, France. The air is thick with declarations 
about the end of art, the end of the image, the reign of 
communications and advertisements, the impossibility of art after 
Auschwitz, nostalgia for the lost paradise of incarnate presence, 
indictment of aesthetic utopias for spawning totalitarianism or 
commodification. My purpose has not been to join this mourning 
choir. On the contrary I think that we can distance ourselves from this 
current mood if we understand that the ‘end of art’ is not a 
mischievous destiny of ‘modernity’, but the reverse side of the life of 
art.  ( p.150) 
The theories of Jacques Rancière that are based on the principle of equality give us a 
chance to consider art, notably cinema and politics with a theory of emancipation. 
The method of Rancière does not let spectator feel as a passive subject that is 
exposed to images and ideas in cinema theater, but instead an active subject because 
of the ability of thinking, seeing, creating relations and bonds. Such an approach 
brings an important critique of not only grand theories such as the postmodernism. It 
is possible to see effects of different thinkers and resemblances in the works of 
Rancière. But it is important to underline that, he comes up with a complete theory of 
politics and emancipation, and an egalitarian logic which is unique. 
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